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Notes and Comments
Erosion of the Confrontation Clause
in the Ocean State: Admitting
Declarations of a Decedent Made
in Good Faith
I. INTRODUCTION
Rhode Island's courts have opened the door to a hearsay excep-
tion which erodes defendants' rights under the Confrontation
Clause of the United States Constitution.' In two recent criminal
cases the Rhode Island Supreme Court admitted hearsay state-
ments by deceased declarants into evidence under Rhode Island
Rule of Evidence 804(c), 2 an exception which is unique to Rhode
Island's criminal justice system. 3 Used for decades in testamen-
tary and other civil proceedings, 4 this rule requires the court to
1. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
2. "A declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmissible in evidence
as hearsay if the court finds that it was made in good faith before the commence-
ment of the action and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant." R.I. R.
Evid. 804(c). Unlike the exception for dying declarations, statements made under
this provision do not have to be made under belief of impending death, nor must
they concern the cause or circumstances of the impending death. See R.I. R. Evid.
804(b)(2). Under certain circumstances, however, these statements may also be
admissible under R.I. R. Evid. 804(b)(2). See, e.g., State v. Burke, 574 A.2d 1217
(R.I. 1990).
3. While other states have similar exceptions, they are limited to use in civil
proceedings. The federal rules exception for statements of recent perception was
similar, but was applied more broadly. Wisconsin and New Mexico are the only
states to adopt it for use in criminal prosecutions. See infra part 111.2.
4. See, e.g., Morinville v. Old Colony Coop. Newport Natl Bank, 522 A.2d
1218, 1221 (R.I. 1987) (affirming trial court's admission of decedent's declaration
under § 9-19-11); Hamrick v. Yellow Cab Co., 304 A.2d 666 (R.I. 1973) (declining
to admit statements of decedent in a negligence action where they were not made
in good faith); Desmarais v. Taft-Pierce Mfg. Co., 252 A.2d 445 (R.I. 1969) (admit-
ting declarations of decedent in a negligence action where compliance with specific
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find that a deceased declarant made a statement from personal
knowledge in "good faith" before an "action" was commenced. 5
This Note argues that admission of hearsay evidence under Rule
804(c) diminishes the Constitutional confrontation requirement by
improperly treating the rule's elements as guaranteeing the trust-
worthiness of the decedent's statements.
The Confrontation Clause does not completely ban admission
of hearsay statements against a criminal defendant.6 In some in-
stances, it may provide a thin additional layer of protection for a
criminal defendant presented with unavailable witness hearsay
statements,7 by barring admission of such evidence where it might
otherwise be admissible under a hearsay exception.8 In other situ-
ations, hearsay exceptions permit admission of unavailable wit-
ness testimony despite the Clause.9 As an exception for hearsay
provisions of the statute was not explicit, but could be circumstantially inferred);
R.I. Hosp. Trust Co. v. Letendre, 77 A.2d 203 (R.I. 1950) (declarations of deceased
admitted with note to weigh such declarations with caution); Segee v. Cowan, 20
A.2d 270 (R.I. 1941) (admitting statements made by decedent regarding accident
in a personal injury action); Caswell v. Bathrick, 164 A. 505 (R.I. 1933) (admitting
declarations of deceased testatrix in estate dispute); Paulson v. Paulson, 145 A.
312 (R.I. 1929) (admitting declarations of decedent but indicating such should be
done by carefully weighing the circumstances surrounding the statement).
5. R.I. R. Evid. 804(c). Prior to Rule 804(c), the provision for declarations of
decedents made in good faith was included in the Rhode Island General Laws. R.I.
Gen. Laws § 9-19-11 (Reenactment 1985) (as enacted by P.L. 1927, ch. 1048, § 1
and repealed by P.L. 1987, ch. 381, § 5).
6. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 813 (1990) (confirming that although
the admission of hearsay statements might actually violate the Confrontation
Clause, precedent requires that not all hearsay statements be forbidden). See, e.g.,
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
407-8 (1965). This is also true in cases where a witness is unavailable, since on its
face the Confrontation Clause could bar admission of any statements made by un-
available witnesses. A long line of cases indicates the literal interpretation of the
Clause is not the accepted one. See, e.g., Wright, 497 U.S. at 813; Bourjaily v.
United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). The
United States Supreme Court has indicated that while the Confrontation Clause
and the hearsay doctrine protect "similar values" they are not "congruent." 4 David
W. Louisell & Christopher B. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 418, at 131 (1st ed.
1980).
7. See, e.g., Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 (reasoning that the "Confrontation Clause
reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial," and that cross-exami-
nation is a major interest secured by the Clause).
8. Wright, 497 U.S. at 814.
9. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87 (1970) (admitting hearsay in a
prosecution where evidence was neither "crucial" nor "devastating"); United
States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 494-502 (1976) (upholding use of unsigned, un-
sworn statement of co-offender implicating the accused where statements were not
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statements of unavailable declarants, Rule 804(c) does not provide
defendants with the minimal protection required by the Confronta-
tion Clause. 10 This Note supports the view that hearsay evidence
should not be admitted under Rule 804(c) in criminal proceedings
because it violates a defendant's right to confront the witnesses
against him under the Confrontation Clause.
The presence of Rule 804(c) distinguishes Rhode Island's rules
from the Federal Rules of Evidence and most other state eviden-
tiary codes.' 1 In other states, similar provisions have been con-
fined to civil cases. 12 At the federal level the rule was rejected
completely. 13 Rhode Island, however, elected to change the entire
characterization of this provision. History suggests that the Rhode
Island legislature's original purpose was to provide a method for
admitting certain testimony in civil actions, primarily testamen-
tary proceedings. 14 True to this objective, Rule 804(c) was not used
outside reported civil cases until the adoption of the Rhode Island
crucial to government's case). Louisell Evidence, supra note 6, § 418, at 151-52,
n.21.
10. Reading the Confrontation Clause narrowly leads to the theory that the
accused is entitled to be physically present when testimony against him is given.
Louisell Evidence, supra note 6, § 418, at 124. In a broader sense, the Clause could
be read as giving the accused the opportunity to cross-examine and face witnesses.
Id. at 125. Even more broadly, the accused might be entitled to exclude out of
court statements. Id. The main concern with hearsay is the reconciliation of the
public's need for useful evidence in prosecuting defendants with the defendant's
right to confront the witnesses against him. Theoretically, hearsay which "falls
within an exception is attended by surrounding circumstances that make it more
reliable than ordinary extra-judicial statements." Graham C. Lilly, An Introduc-
tion to the Law of Evidence, § 7.29, at 311 (2d ed. 1987).
11. See, e.g., 4 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence
804-189 to 804-206 (1994) (presenting a summary of state adaptation of hearsay
exceptions not found within the federal rules).
12. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 223, § 65 (West 1985). See infra part 111.1 for a
historical overview of the origination of the rule in Massachusetts.
13. See infra part 111.2 for a discussion of the proposed federal rule for state-
ments of recent perception.
14. The statute was likely enacted to combat the evidentiary problems
brought on by dead man's statutes which made surviving parties in a transaction
with a deceased person incompetent to testify to the extent that his testimony
might be questioned by the deceased party. 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses § 557 (1992).
In statutes such as that enacted in Massachusetts, the provision was considered to
be a "compensating provision" which relaxed the rule against hearsay so that dece-
dent's statements could be admitted where survivor's testimony was freely admis-
sible. Id. § 564. See infra part III for a full discussion of Rule 804(c)'s history and
evolution.
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Rules of Evidence in 198715 which broadened its applicability.
Rhode Island's advisory committee on evidence seemingly ignored
60 years of precedent in opening the rule for use in both civil and
criminal forums, resulting in potentially inescapable prejudice to
criminal defendants faced with this type of hearsay evidence at
trial.
The issue of using Rule 804(c) in a criminal setting first
reached the state's high court in State v. Burke,16 and was not re-
visited again until 1995 when State v. Scholl"7 was decided. Both
cases involved assault crimes against elderly individuals in which
the victims died before trial.' In Burke and Scholl, the court
adopted the state evidence advisory committee's recommendations
regarding the scope of the rule, refused to consider the rule's long
history and original purpose, and contorted their reasoning regard-
ing its application. As a result, the court failed to reconcile differ-
ing interpretations of this rule in each case, causing uncertainty
regarding the actual meaning behind the rule's elements. The
court treated the elements of the rule as themselves providing the
trustworthiness necessary to carry a hearsay statement past the
Confrontation Clause barrier. This reasoning lead the court to
broaden usage of a rule which provides little if any protection to
defendants under the Sixth Amendment. Such a dangerous prece-
dent should be carefully reconsidered before defendants' confronta-
tion rights are further dissipated.
Part II of this Note reviews both the Sixth Amendment issues
and the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the
hearsay doctrine to establish the setting in which Rule 804(c) must
be interpreted. Part III addresses the history behind the rule,
comparing its evolution with the similar Massachusetts provision
and the Federal Rules of Evidence. The development of the rule in
Rhode Island and elsewhere establishes the original drafters' in-
15. R.I. R. Evid. 804(c) advisory committee's note. The committee noted that
this exception, unlike the traditional dying declarations exception, applied in all
civil and criminal cases, and was "not limited to the cause or circumstances of the
declarant's impending death." They also stated that there appeared "no persua-
sive reason to limit the exception to civil cases," since the constitutionality of ad-
mitting such statements must be made on a case by case basis. Id.
16. 574 A.2d 1217 (R.I. 1990) (affirming conviction of defendants for robbery,
attempted robbery, and assault and battery on a person over 60 years of age).
17. 661 A.2d 55 (R.I. 1995) (affirming conviction of defendant for robbery and
felony murder).
18. See infra parts IV.1-.2 for a discussion of the facts of each case.
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tent for the applicability of the rule, and presents the sharp depar-
ture from that intent in the adoption of the Rhode Island Rules of
Evidence. Part IV presents an evaluation of the rule's components
under the constitutional framework to establish that 804(c) does
not provide the same circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
as the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. Part V is an anal-
ysis of the Rhode Island Supreme Court's interpretation of the rule
in criminal proceedings to date, demonstrating that the only prece-
dents for use of this rule in a prosecution have set a path which
cannot be followed without adversely impacting a defendant's right
to confrontation.
II. HEARSAY AND THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted."19 Until federal codification of
hearsay rules in 1975, the admission of hearsay evidence was
largely dealt with by common law rules and exceptions. 20 For the
purposes of this Note, hearsay is confined to statements made by
deceased individuals which are then repeated in court by testifying
witnesses. The primary concern regarding admission of hearsay
evidence is that the individual making the statement cannot be
cross-examined at trial. Cross-examination tests the sincerity, ve-
racity, memory and perception of a witness and serves to filter am-
biguities in testimony.21
19. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Sometime during the late 1600s hearsay became an
accepted form of evidence. 5 John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 1364, at 18 (Chadbourn
rev. 1974).
20. See Joanne A. Epps, Passing the Confrontation Clause Stop Sign: Is All
Hearsay Constitutionally Admissible?, 77 Ky. L.J. 7, 14 (1989).
21. Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 957, 958-61
(1974) (describing the testimonial triangle which sets out the possible inaccuracies
in the inferential chain when the statement being examined has not been made in
court, under oath, by a person whose demeanor at the time is witnessed by the
factfinder, or under circumstances permitting immediate cross-examination by
counsel). Defects in perception reflect the concern that a statement may be unreli-
able because the declarant did not observe or hear accurately. Lilly, supra note 10,
§ 6.1, at 182. Problems with memory reflect the danger that the declarant's recol-
lection may have been inaccurate or incomplete. Id. The concern with a declar-
ant's sincerity simply questions whether the statement was truthful, and
ambiguity may result where a declarant has used a word or phrase that has a
special meaning or when a statement is incomplete. Id.
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Where cross-examination is impossible, an adversary loses the
ability to bring such tainted testimony to the attention of the trier
of fact. Therefore, as the common law has evolved, hearsay state-
ments have been admissible as evidence only through numerous
exceptions. 22 Hearsay exceptions developed because of the need
for hearsay evidence to secure justice in certain cases, and because
the inherent reliability of some hearsay justified its admissibil-
ity.23 An example of such excepted hearsay evidence deemed in-
herently reliable is former testimony, where the proponent in the
present trial offers testimony given in an earlier hearing or pro-
ceeding. 24 Under this exception, hearsay risks "are minimized by
the prior opportunity to test or develop the [witness's] testi-
mony".25 Numerous specific exceptions as well as residual or
"catch-all" exceptions are codified at the federal level and in the
Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.26
The Confrontation Clause27 collides with those hearsay excep-
tions which serve to admit out-of-court statements by unavailable
22. The Federal Rules of Evidence contain 27 specific exceptions, and two
residual or catchall exceptions to the rule against hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 803, 804.
The Rhode Island rules largely parallel the federal rules, but add one additional
exception, "Declaration of Decedent Made in Good Faith." R.I. R. Evid. 804(c). The
United States Supreme Court has noted that the hearsay rule was "riddled with
exceptions developed over three centuries" and that such exceptions "vary among
jurisdictions as to number, nature and detail." Roberts, 448 U.S. at 62.
23. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Subversion of the Hearsay Rule: The Residual
Hearsay Exceptions, Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness, and Grand
Jury Testimony, 36 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 431, 435 n.18 (1986). According to Wig-
more, "the great principle underlying the [hearsay] exceptions were [n]ecessity and
[c]ircumstantial [g]uarantees of [t]rustworthiness." Id. The term "reliability" is
interchangeable with the concept of trustworthiness. Id. Some commentators
have suggested the hearsay rules are too harsh and prevent much valuable evi-
dence from being used in court. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of
Hearsay, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 331 (1961) (arguing that present evidence rules do not
provide a satisfactory solution to the hearsay problem); James J. Chadbourn, Ben-
tham and the Hearsay Rule - A Benthamic View of Rule 63(4)(c) of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 932 (1962); Wigmore, supra note 19, § 1577, at
540.
24. See, e.g., R.I. R. Evid. 804(b)1.
25. Lilly, supra note 10, § 7.22, at 285.
26. R.I. R. Evid. 803, 804. Exceptions under Rule 803 apply to situations
where the availability of the declarant is immaterial, while those under Rule 804
apply when the declarant is unavailable.
27. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him .... " U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Con-
frontation Clause is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
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declarants.28 If applied literally, the Clause would abrogate nearly
every hearsay exception. 29 The accused is entitled to be present at
trial to see and hear the witnesses against him,30 and beyond that,
he has the right to cross-examine witnesses. 31 The Rhode Island
Constitution contains a similar provision, 32 and its supreme court
has often held "that the right to cross-examination is guaranteed
by the [C]onfrontation [Cilause of the Sixth Amendment."33
The strict requirement of confrontation in the Sixth Amend-
ment, however, does not necessarily prohibit the use of hearsay in
a criminal trial,3 4 as demonstrated by the numerous exceptions to
the rule against hearsay.35 The United States Supreme Court has
found that "[wihile a literal interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause could bar the use of any out-of-court statements when the
declarant is unavailable, this Court has rejected that view as 'un-
intended and too extreme.'"36 At the same time, however, the
28. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970) ("Given the similarity of the
values protected [by the hearsay rules and Confrontation Clause], however, the
modification of a State's hearsay rules to create new exceptions for the admission
of evidence against a defendant, will often raise questions of compatibility with the
defendant's constitutional right to confrontation.").
29. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (stating that the clause was not
meant to be read as such, and the result of such reading had long been rejected as
unintended and too extreme).
30. Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Modern Evidence § 8.74,
at 1449 n.4 (1995).
31. Id. at 1450. The United States Supreme Court said the clause envisions "a
personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused
has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of
the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that
they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner
in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief." Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
32. R.I. Const., art. 1 § 10.
33. State v. Correia, 600 A.2d 279, 285 (R.I. 1991) (quoting State v. Dame, 488
A.2d 418, 423 (R.I. 1985); State v. DeBarros, 441 A.2d 549, 552 (R.I. 1982)).
34. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
295 (1973) (stating that the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
'competing interests," i.e., public policy and the necessities of the case versus con-
frontation, may warrant dispensing confrontation at trial)).
35. See, e.g., R.I. R. Evid. 803(1)-(24); R.I. R. Evid. 804(b)(1)-(5); R.I. R. Evid.
804(c).
36. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990) (quoting Bourjaily v. United
States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987) (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 (1980))). Wright
was a child molestation case where the court considered the admissibility of out-of-
court statements made by a 2-1/2-year-old child to her pediatrician regarding al-
leged abuse. Wright, 497 U.S. 805.
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Confrontation Clause affords a criminal defendant protection
against inaccurate, untrustworthy testimony, particularly when
the witness testifying against the accused is unavailable. 37
Therein lies the tension between the rule against hearsay and the
defendant's right to confrontation.
There are few situations involving an unavailable declarant
which rise to the level of trustworthiness that would be sufficient
for such testimony to be admitted at trial.38 Generally, the hear-
say rules for testimony of an unavailable witness incorporate two
substitutes for actual cross-examination and oath. First, a rule of
necessity demands that the prosecutor demonstrates the unavaila-
bility of the declarant whose statement is to be admitted at trial. 39
This is satisfied by one of five situations: the declarant's death,
physical or mental illness, exemption by ruling of the court on the
ground of privilege, refusal to testify despite an order of the court
to do so, lack of memory on the subject matter, or flight from the
court's jurisdiction. 40
The prosecution must also establish indicia of reliability in the
unavailable declarant's testimony which affords "the trier of fact a
satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior state-
ment."41 The United States Supreme Court applied the "indicia of
37. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 (setting forth the general approach to hearsay
analysis under the Confrontation Clause).
38. This is demonstrated in the federal rules, which are generally followed in
Rhode Island. Where it is immaterial whether a witness is available, 23 specific
exceptions and one residual exception have evolved and are included in the federal
rules. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(1)-(24) (availability of declarant immaterial). Where
the witness is unavailable there are only four specific exceptions and one residual
exception to the hearsay rule. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1)-(5) (unavailable declarant).
See, e.g., Wright, 497 U.S. at 813-827 (1990) (holding that admission of a victim's
hearsay statements under the residual exception of the federal rules of evidence
violated defendant's Confrontation Clause rights).
39. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. While Ohio v. Roberts seemed to suggest that to
satisfy the Confrontation Clause the unavailable declarant would have to either be
produced at trial or be found unavailable before his out of court statement could be
admitted, later cases declined to follow that lead. See also United States v. Inadi,
475 U.S. 387 (1986). This requirement was narrowed at the federal level, where
the Supreme Court stated "unavailability analysis is a necessary part of the Con-
frontation Clause inquiry only when the challenged out-of-court statements were
made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding." White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736,
741 (1992). This point, however, is not relevant in the analysis of 804(c), since the
rule requires that the declarant be deceased. R.I. R. Evid. 804(c).
40. Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(1)-(5); R.I. R. Evid. 804(a)(1)-(5).
41. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970). See also Roberts, 448 U.S.
at 63 (citing Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)). "[I]t is difficult to
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reliability" requirement in Ohio v. Roberts42 when it found that
certain hearsay exceptions rest upon "such solid foundations" that
admitting "virtually any evidence within them" does not offend the
constitutional protection of confrontation. 43 Reliability may be in-
ferred without more where evidence falls within a "firmly rooted"
hearsay exception.4 4 Otherwise, evidence must be excluded unless
there is a showing of "particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness."45 An exception is firmly rooted where it is implicitly
grounded in "longstanding judicial and legislative experience in as-
sessing [its] trustworthiness."46 For example, the exceptions for
dying declarations, prior testimony, and business and public
records are considered firmly rooted. 47 On the other hand, the
United States Supreme Court has declared some exceptions are
not firmly rooted.48 An example is the residual exception, Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5), which the Court found accommodated
"ad hoc" situations where statements not otherwise falling into a
recognized exception might still be reliable for use at trial.49 It is
unclear, however, whether firmly rooted is a function of longevity,
the number of jurisdictions recognizing it,50 or something else.
When a firmly rooted exception is not present, the Court re-
quires that additional steps be taken to determine whether testi-
mony possesses particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
which would make it admissible.5 1 Particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness must be shown from the totality of the circum-
conceive of a case in which the admitted hearsay had the accouterments of reliabil-
ity and yet was without a sufficient basis for evaluation by the trier." Lilly, supra
note 10, § 7.31, at 326 n.8.
42. 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (holding that introduction of preliminary hearing testi-
mony was constitutionally permissible under the Confrontation Clause where it
bore sufficient "indicia of reliability."). In Roberts, the defendant was charged with
forgery of a check and possession of stolen credit cards. A witness made a state-
ment regarding the charges during a preliminary hearing, but was unavailable for
trial despite numerous attempts to procure her presence. The trial court admitted
the transcript of the preliminary hearing, and the defendant was convicted.
43. See id. at 66.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990).
47. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1990).
48. Wright, 497 U.S. at 817 (finding that the residual exception is not firmly
rooted).
49. Id.
50. Lilly, supra note 10, § 7.31, at 331.
51. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
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stances surrounding the making of the statement and the credibil-
ity of the declarant. 52 In addition, hearsay evidence used to
convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of
its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other corroborat-
ing evidence at trial.53
In Idaho v. Wright, the United States Supreme Court reasoned
that evidence used to corroborate a hearsay statement's particular-
ized guarantees of trustworthiness essentially bootstraps on the
trustworthiness of the corroborating evidence, circumventing the
Confrontation Clause's mandate that hearsay evidence be "so
trustworthy that cross-examination of the declarant would be of
marginal utility."54 The Court, however, refused to support a
mechanical test for determining particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness, preferring to consider factors relating to whether the
declarant was "particularly likely to be telling the truth when the
statement was made."5 5 Such factors included an adequate chance
to observe, spontaneity of speaking, likelihood of sufficient recollec-
tion, and absence of motive to falsify.56 These factors parallel the
classic hearsay concerns of misperception, inaccurate narration,
faulty memory, and insincerity, respectively.
Any substantive modification of a state's hearsay rules for un-
available declarants must necessarily undergo a rigorous examina-
tion in the courts to maintain the balance between the public need
for evidence and the defendant's right to confrontation. The rule
and its practical application should provide the trier of fact with
sufficient information to determine the reliability and accuracy of
the statements presented, and to accurately consider the condi-
tions surrounding the making of the statements. It should serve as
a reliable substitute for a defendant's right to confrontation. In the
52. Wright, 497 U.S. at 820.
53. Id. at 822.
54. Id. See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 544 (1986) (declining to rely on cor-
roborative physical evidence); State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197, 204 (Wash. 1984) (re-
quiring reference to "circumstances surrounding the making of the out-of-court
statement, and not from subsequent corroboration of the criminal act.").
55. Wright, 497 U.S. at 822 (refusing to consider medical evidence of sexual
abuse as corroborating the reliability of the child's identification of the abuser).
56. Id. at 821-22 (citing State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801, 811 (Ariz. 1987)
(spontaneity and consistent repetition); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 948 (4th
Cir. 1988) (mental state of the declarant); State v. Sorenson, 421 N.W.2d 77, 85
(Wisc. 1988) (use of unexpected terminology by a child); State v. Kuone, 757 P.2d
289, 292-93 (Kan. 1988) (lack of motive to fabricate)).
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case of Rule 804(c), history suggests that such an evaluation might
never have been required but for the abrupt alteration of the basic
objectives of this rule by the drafters of the Rhode Island Rules of
Evidence.
III. FOUNDATION OF RULE 804(c)
Rule of Evidence 804(c), and its predecessor Rhode Island Gen-
eral Law section 9-19-11, is a longstanding evidentiary provision
in Rhode Island law.5 7 When the State enacted the original stat-
ute in 1927, it based the provision on a Massachusetts statute for
declarations of deceased persons.58 While Massachusetts courts
limited application of the statute for decedent declarations to civil
cases,59 Rhode Island courts have not.60 At the federal level, Con-
gress refused to include a provision similar in scope to the Rhode
Island rule.61 Rhode Island went further than either Massachu-
setts or the federal rules when it permitted Rule 804(c)'s use in
criminal prosecutions, eventually opening the exception to chal-
lenge under the Confrontation Clause. 62 The Rhode Island advi-
sory committee on the rules of evidence discarded the rule's roots
provision with potentially adverse impact on criminal defendants.
57. R.I. R. Evid. 804(c); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-19-11 (Reenactment 1985) (as en-
acted by P.L. 1927, ch. 1048, § 1 and repealed by P.L. 1987, ch. 381, § 5).
58. 1898 Mass. Acts ch. 535.
59. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mandeville, 436 N.E.2d 912 (Mass. 1982)
(holding that the statutory exception for statements of deceased persons does not
apply in criminal cases); Desrosiers v. Germain, 429 N.E.2d 385 (Mass. 1981) (ad-
mitting statements of deceased mother made years after she created a joint bank
account with daughter); Saldi v. Brighton Stock Yard Co., 181 N.E.2d 687 (Mass.
1962) (considering past statements in tort action for negligence brought by execu-
trix for injuries suffered by her decedent); Re Keenan, 192 N.E. 65 (Mass. 1934)
(declaration of deceased juryman in regard to misconduct of an attorney); Com-
monwealth v. Galo, 175 N.E. 718 (Mass. 1931) (holding the rule for decedent dec-
larations not applicable in criminal prosecutions); Phillips v. Chase, 87 N.E. 755
(Mass. 1909) (reviewing declarations of deceased wife reacting to adoption of a
child).
60. See State v. Scholl, 661 A.2d 55 (R.I. 1995); State v. Burke, 574 A.2d 1217
(R.I. 1990).
61. This was the proposed federal exception for statements of recent percep-
tion, discussed supra part 111.2. The main difference between the two exceptions is
that this exception is not limited to statements of deceased declarants. Weinstein
& Berger, supra note 11, at 804-13.
62. R.I. R. Evid. 804(c), advisory committee's note. See supra part 111.3 for the
advisory committee's approach to the applicability of the rule.
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III.1 The Origin of the Rule
The early 1800s sparked interest in broadening the scope of
admissible hearsay evidence63 and reducing the confusion sur-
rounding the existing system,64 a trend which continues to this
day.65 In 1898, Massachusetts enacted a statute, applicable to
civil cases, which contained a general hearsay exception for all
statements of deceased persons who had competent knowledge and
no apparent interest to deceive. 66 This exception, the first of its
kind, provided the following: "No declaration of a deceased person
shall be excluded as evidence on the ground of its being hearsay if
it appears to the satisfaction of the judge to have been made in
good faith before the beginning of the suit and upon the personal
knowledge of the declarant."67 The statute "contained carefully
prescribed limitations," including requirements that the declarant
be deceased at the time of trial, and that the exception be applied
only to civil cases. 68
The Massachusetts legislature and courts collaborated to clar-
ify the limitations of the exception. The original form of the stat-
ute was amended to change the phrase "before the beginning of the
suit" to "commencement of the action."6 9 The Massachusetts high
court found that this phrase meant that the rule was to be applied
exclusively in civil actions. 70 In 1943 the Massachusetts legisla-
63. Wigmore, supra note 19, § 1576, at 529. ("There was a time in the early
1800s when it became near to being settled that a general exception should exist
for all statements of deceased persons who had competent knowledge and no ap-
parent interest to deceive; but this tendency was of short duration .. ").
64. The chief criticisms of the hearsay rules through the years are generally
cited as their complexity and their failure to achieve the "purpose of screening good
evidence from bad." 2 John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 325, at 373
(1992).
65. See generally id. § 327, at 378-380 (postulating that prediction of the fu-
ture course of hearsay rules is hazardous at best, but that changes will generally
move in the direction of liberalizing admission of hearsay); Lilly, supra note 10,
§ 7.28, at 304-311 (noting that hearsay exceptions are the product of an evolution-
ary process which began two centuries ago, and continue through the present day
in such rules as the residual exception).
66. 1898 Mass. Act ch. 535; Wigmore, supra note 19, § 1576, at 533.
67. Id.
68. Charles W. Quick, Hearsay, Excitement, Necesssity and the Uniform Rules:
A Reappraisal of Rule 63(4), 6 Wayne L.Rev. 204, 217 (1960).
69. See Wigmore, supra note 19, § 1576, n.11.
70. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Galo, 175 N.E. 718, 725 (Mass. 1931) (finding
that twenty years of judicial interpretation indicates that the rule is not intended
for application in criminal prosecutions).
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ture deleted "the requirement that the declaration be made before
the commencement of the action,"71 further liberalizing the stat-
ute.7 2 The legislature, agreeing with the court's limitation on ap-
plicability, subsequently made its intent explicit by adopting the
current version: "[In any action or other civil judicial proceeding, a
declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmissible in evi-
dence as hearsay or as private conversation between husband and
wife, as the case may be, if the court finds that it was made in good
faith and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant."73 The
Massachusetts law has remained in this form since 1943.
In recommending adoption of a similar provision nationally in
1938, the American Bar Association's Committee on the Improve-
ment of the Law of Evidence recognized both the value of the hear-
say rule and the need for certain exceptions.74 At that time, there
were about a dozen exceptions, most based on situations where
cross-examination was no longer practicable, where "it is better to
accept what can be got than to reject it entirely."7 5 In supporting
adoption of a provision similar to Massachusetts', the committee
noted that "the Massachusetts statute has given rise to virtually
no technical trouble in interpretation ....- 76
111.2 The Federal Response to Massachusetts' Ingenuity
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not contain a provision simi-
lar to either Rhode Island's or Massachusetts' rules on declarations
of decedents. However, such provisions have been considered at
the federal level since the latter part of the 19th century.7 7 Legal
scholars of the time were attempting to resolve the issue of estab-
lishing a claim or defense when "the only witness with knowledge
of what occurred is unavailable[.]" 78 To address this, the 1938
American Bar Association committee recommended that all juris-
71. Wigmore, supra note 19, § 1576, at 533 n.ll.
72. Id.
73. Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch. 233, § 65 (West 1995) (emphasis added).
74. Quick, supra note 68, at 217.
75. American Bar Association's Committee on the Improvement of the Law of
Evidence note (1938) reprinted in Wigmore, supra note 19, § 1577, at 536.
76. Id. Despite this early support, such a provision was never adopted by Con-
gress for the federal rules of evidence. See infra part 111.2.
77. Quick, supra note 68, at 216-17.
78. Weinstein & Berger, supra note 11, at 804-202. In attempting to resolve
this problem, the evidence reformers eventually promulgated Uniform Rule
63(4)(c), which was termed "the most far reaching exception" contained in the 1953
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dictions adopt the Massachusetts provision, limited to civil pro-
ceedings. 79 Despite the committee's support for a permissive view
of hearsay exceptions in its 1942 Model Code of Evidence,80 this
Uniform Rules of Evidence. Id. (quoting Quick, supra note 68, at 215). This rule
read as follows:
[I]f the declarant is unavailable as a witness, a statement narrating,
describing or explaining an event or condition which the judge finds was
made by the declarant at a time when the matter had been visibly per-
ceived by him and while his recollection was clear, and was made in good
faith prior to the commencement of the action.
Id. at 804-202 n.2. The most controversial aspect of this rule was its proposed
application to criminal cases. Id. at 804-202. "The wisdom of this extension was
questioned by a number of legal authorities who feared that overreaching and un-
scrupulous prosecutors could take advantage of such an exception to obtain unjus-
tified convictions." Id. at 804-203.
79. Wigmore, supra note 19, § 1576 at 536. The relevant part of the American
Bar Association Committee report is as follows:
The Hearsay Rule, requiring that all testimonial assertions be sub-
jected to the scrutiny and test of cross-examination, and therefore exclud-
ing all statements made out of court and not so tested, is a most valuable
rule, being one of the great contributions of Anglo-American law for the
methodical investigation of facts.
But of course it has always had to recognize exceptions; there are a
dozen or more of them, having large scope. Many or most of them are
based on situations where the test of cross-examination is no longer prac-
ticable - the person being deceased or otherwise unavailable - and that
therefore it is better to accept what can be got than to reject it entirely.
The scope of these Exceptions has been gradually enlarged, over the
past century. And just 40 years ago the State of Massachusetts (at the
instance of Professor James Bradley Thayer, known as the greatest au-
thority on the law of Evidence) undertook to make another enlargement,
viz. to admit in general the declaration of a deceased person who had had
personal knowledge and spoke or wrote in good faith before controversy
had arisen.
The Massachusetts statute has given rise to virtually no technical
trouble in interpretation, and it stands today as indorsed [sic] by 40 years
of trial experience.
Id.
80. Id. § 1577, at 536 n.2. The Model Code took an extremely liberal view of
admissibility of statements by an unavailable declarant, and in fact, its proposed
Rule 503(a) provided that "[elvidence of a hearsay declaration is admissible if the
judge finds that the declarant ... is unavailable as a witness . . . ." Id. at 537
(quoting Chadbourn, supra note 23). Between this rule which threatened to swal-
low the rule against hearsay and the huge latitude given to trial judges, this provi-
sion and the Model Code in general met with vehement opposition and was not
adopted anywhere. Id. at 538.
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provision was modified and included as Rule 63(4)(c) in the 1953
Uniform Rules of Evidence.8 ' The exception read as follows:
Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a wit-
ness while testifying at the hearing offered to prove the truth
of the matter stated is hearsay evidence and inadmissible ex-
cept:... (4) ... (c) if the declarant is unavailable as a witness,
a statement narrating, describing or explaining an event or
condition which the judge finds was made by the declarant at
a time when the matter had been recently perceived by him
and while his recollection was clear, and was made in good
faith prior to the commencement of the action .... 82
While clause (c) was drafted "so as to indicate an attitude of reluc-
tance and require most careful scrutiny in admitting hearsay
statements under its provisions,"8 3 no language limiting the appli-
cation of the exception to civil actions was included in either the
proposal or the National Conference of Commissioner's comment.8 4
The provision's applicability in criminal prosecutions was implicit
in the absence of limitations to civil actions. However, the Com-
missioners gave no reasons for extending the rule to criminal situ-
ations.8 5 In a 1956 writing, a URE Commissioner added that
extending the subsection "to criminal as well as civil cases will
open the door to statements by victims of crime which can meet the
condition of trustworthiness, even though consciousness of im-
pending death would not appear and would not be eligible as dying
declarations."86
81. Id. at 538. The Uniform Rules of Evidence [hereinafter URE] were drafted
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and were
not adopted for use at the federal level.
82. Id. The URE defined unavailability much as the Model Code had, as
follows:
Unavailability as a witness includes situations where the witness is (a)
exempted on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the matter
to which his statement is relevant, or (b) disqualified from testifying to
the matter, (c) unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of
death or then existing physical or mental illness, or (d) absent beyond the
jurisdiction of the court to compel appearance by its process, or (e) absent
from the place of hearing because the proponent of his statement does not
know and with diligence has been unable to ascertain his whereabouts.
Quick, supra note 68, at 218, n.53 (quoting Unif. R. Evid. 62(7)).
83. Quick, supra note 68, at 219, n.59.
84. Id. at 219.
85. Id.
86. Id. (quoting McCormick, Hearsay, 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 620, 624 (1956)).
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Later commentary on the Uniform Rules spawned criticism of
the expansion of the rule to criminal cases.8 7 Professor Quick, in
1960, stated:
If adopted, this exception would apply in all criminal cases
without a showing of necessity, if by necessity we mean evi-
dence of what occurred. Nor, indeed, would the exception be
restricted to declarations of victims .... The statement of a
witness . . . not subject to effective impeachment, or the ca-
thartic effects of cross-examination may be used by an over-
zealous prosecutor to deprive one of his liberty or, in some
cases, of his life.88
Professor Chadbourn added that there was an area of "permissible
change" for enlarging traditional hearsay exceptions between con-
stitutional guarantees against hearsay use8 9 and the use of tradi-
tional exceptions:
Whether the large exception.., advocated by the Model Code
could be fitted within this area is, to say the least,
doubtful....
... Would not a nearer approach to middle be a subdivi-
sion of rule 63, providing this: In civil cases a statement by a
declarant [is admissible] if the judge finds that such declar-
ant is unavailable and the statement would have been admis-
sible if made by the declarant as a witness. 90
While doubts existed as to the efficacy of this form of exception, in
1969 the federal advisory committee on the rules of evidence pro-
posed Rule 804(b)(2), "Statement of Recent Perception," which was
essentially a restatement of Uniform Rule 63(4)(c). 91 In its com-
ments, the advisory committee cited the "well known" Massachu-
87. See Quick, supra note 68; Chadbourn, supra note 23.
88. Quick, supra note 68, at 219-20.
89. Chadbourn, supra note 23, at 951. Professor Chadbourn was reassessing
the views of Jeremy Bentham, an originator of the evidence reform movement
which resulted in the Model Code of Evidence. Chadbourn, supra, at 933.
90. Id.
91. Weinstein & Berger, supra note 11, at 804-201 to 202. Proposed Rule
804(b)(2) read as follows:
A statement, not in response to the instigation of a person engaged in
investigating, litigating or settling a claim, which narrates, describes or
explains an event or condition recently perceived by the declarant, made
in good faith, not in contemplation of pending or anticipated litigation in
which he was interested, and while his recollection was clear.
Rule 804. Hearsay Exceptions: Declarant Unavailable, 56 F.R.D. 183, 321 (1972).
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setts Act of 1898 and Rhode Island General Law section 9-19-11 in
support of Rule 804(b)(2). 92 "With respect to the question whether
the introduction of a statement under this exception against the
accused in a criminal case would violate his right of confronta-
tion,"93 the committee referred to the former testimony exception,
stating that former testimony:
[Is not admissible if the right of confrontation is denied or...
if the accused was not a party to the prior hearing.... Mat-
tox v. United States (citation omitted) held that the right was
not violated by the Government's use, on a retrial of the same
case, of testimony given at the first trial by two witnesses
since deceased. 94
The committee seemed to imply that the constitutional admissibil-
ity of dying declarations and former testimony in criminal cases
extended to statements of recent perception as well.
The possible application of the rule in a criminal case, how-
ever, proved the very aspect of the rule which was most trouble-
some to its critics. 95 The House of Representatives hearings on the
provision led to its deletion, largely because the rule was charac-
terized as "an invitation to perjury."96 It created "a new and un-
warranted hearsay exception of great potential breadth. The
committee did not believe that statements of the type referred to
bore sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to justify admissibil-
ity."9 7 In a communication to the Senate, the committee recom-
mended reinstatement of the rule because elimination "disregards
the safeguards which were incorporated in the Rule. Since the
Rule required unavailability of the declarant, the effect of the dele-
tion was simply to eliminate all evidence from that source."98 De-
spite the committee's efforts, the rule was eliminated from the final
bill.99
92. Rule 804. Hearsay Exceptions: Declarant Unavailable, 56 F.R.D. 183, 325
(1973) (reporting the U.S. Supreme Court Advisory Committee notes on proposed
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5)).
93. Id. at 326.
94. Id. at 325.
95. See Louisell & Mueller, supra note 6, at 1006-7 nn.85 & 86.
96. Id. at 1006.
97. Weinstein & Berger, supra note 11, at 804-13 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 650,
93rd Cong., 1st Sess. at 6 (1973) reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7089).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 804-205.
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Despite the rejection of the rule at the federal level, New Mex-
ico and Wisconsin enacted the final draft version of Rule 804,100
containing the statements of recent perception exception, applica-
ble in civil and criminal proceedings.101 Hawaii, North Dakota,
and Wyoming followed the URE, limiting the recent perceptions
exception to civil actions.10 2 Rhode Island has generally followed
the federal rules of evidence as enacted by Congress, and did not
include the exception for statements of recent perception,103 but
rather, liberalized the application of Rule 804(c).
111.3 History of the Rhode Island Rule
Rule 804(c)'s precursor was Rhode Island General Law section
9-19-11, first adopted in 1927.104 This statute, enacted as Chapter
1048 "An Act in Amendment of Chapter 342 of the General Laws
entitled 'of Views, Witnesses, Depositions and Evidence,'"105 was
nearly identical to the 1898 Massachusetts statute. 10 6 The lan-
guage of the rule has not changed since it was originally en-
acted, 10 7 and Rule 804(c) incorporated section 9-19-11 verbatim.108
100. The final "draft" was that version which was submitted to the House of
Representatives, but eventually eliminated from the final bill. See N.M. R. Evid.
11-804(B)(2); Wis. R. Evid. 908.045(2).
101. Weinstein & Berger, supra note 11, at 804-206.
102. Id. The optional provision for statements of recent perception in the Uni-
form Rules contains the phrase "[I]n a civil action or proceeding . ' Unif. R.
Evid. 804(b)(5), 13B U.L.A. 564 (1986).
103. Eric D. Green, Rhode Island Rules of Evidence with Advisory Committee
Notes and Case Law Developments xxxii (1995).
104. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-19-11 (Reenactment 1985) (as enacted by P.L. 1927, ch.
1048, § 1 and repealed by P.L. 1987, ch. 381, § 5). It is likely, as was the case in
Massachusetts's adoption of its similar statute, that this provision was provided to
even out the playing field for survivors and the decedent's estate in actions against
the estate. Rhode Island does not disqualify survivors from testifying in such an
action by reason of their having an interest therein, and thus allow the decedent to
"speak" as well, under § 9-19-11, and its descendant, R.I. R. Evid. 804(c).
105. 1927 R.I. Acts and Resolves ch. 1048, § 1.
106. 1898 Mass. Acts ch. 535.
107. There is little information regarding the intent of the original drafters of
this rule. However, placement of the provision within the General Laws provides
some insight into legislator's views on its purposes. On its adoption in 1927, the
statute amended Title XXXIII of 1923 R.I. Gen. Laws entitled "Of Actions, of
Pleading and Practice, and of Procedure in Courts," found within ch. 342 entitled
"Views, Witnesses, Depositions and Evidence." R.I. Gen. Laws ch. 342 (1923).
This title addressed largely civil matters, while separate titles addressed criminal
proceedings. In the 1938 R.I. Gen. Laws, the provision was placed in ch. 538, enti-
tled "Admissibility and Competency of Evidence" within a subsection entitled "Ad-
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Rhode Island remains the sole state with a provision similar in
scope to the original Massachusetts provision which is applicable
in criminal cases.10 9 As originally enacted, the statute read as fol-
lows: "A declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmissible
in evidence as hearsay if the court finds that it was made in good
faith before the commencement of the action and upon the personal
knowledge of the declarant."110 Rhode Island, however, did not fol-
low Massachusetts, refusing to amend its rule to respond to chang-
ing evidentiary needs.11" ' While the legislative history of the
provision for good faith decedent declarations is sparse, it can be
inferred from the timing of original enactment, the similarity in
language between the Rhode Island and Massachusetts statutes,
missibility of Declarations, Entries and Memoranda of Deceased Persons." R.I.
Gen. Laws, ch. 538, § 6 (1938). All three sections within that subsection related to
civil proceedings. One subsection, separate from that noted above, addressed evi-
dentiary considerations in criminal cases. In the 1956 R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-19-11
was included in the "Evidence" subsection of ch. 9, entitled "Courts and Civil Pro-
cedure Generally" R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-19-11 (1956) (emphasis added); Chapters 11
and 12 addressed criminal offenses and procedures. Id. at §§ 11-13. Because this
provision was positioned in the laws regarding civil proceedings, it is logical to
conclude that it was meant to apply to civil situations. Since it was never included
in a section specifically addressing criminal proceedings one may also inferentially
derive that it was not intended for use in such situations. See also Brief for Appel-
lant at 24, State v. Scholl, 661 A.2d 55 (R.I. 1995).
108. R.I. R. Evid. 804(c) advisory committee's note, reprinted in Green, supra
note 103, at 804-14.
109. See Wigmore, supra note 19, § 1576, n.12. Other states with provisions
which are similar, but applicable only in limited civil situations include: N.J. R.
Evid. § 804(b)(6) (excepting from hearsay rule trustworthy statements of a dece-
dent when made in good faith); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 516:25 (1974) (not exclud-
ing as hearsay statements made by a decedent in good faith and upon personal
knowledge in "actions, suits or proceedings by or against the representatives of
deceased persons"); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-172 (1991) (admitting all written
statements of a deceased person in actions by or against the representatives of
him, and by or against the beneficiaries of any life or accident insurance policy
insuring a person who is deceased at time of trial); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 19-
16-34 (1995) (admitting deceased's statements in actions involving the decedent's
estate by or against representatives of deceased persons, provided trial judge finds
statement was made by decedent, in good faith, on decedent's personal knowledge).
See also Wis. Stat. Ann. § 908.045(2) (admitting statements not made in response
to the instigation of a person engaged in investigating, litigating or settling a
claim, which narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition recently per-
ceived by the declarant, made in good faith, not in contemplation of pending litiga-
tion and while declarant's recollection was clear; applicable in civil and criminal
cases).
110. R.I. Gen. Laws ch. 538, § 6 (1938).
111. R.I. R. Evid. 804(c), reprinted in Green, supra note 103, at 804-14.
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and the placement of the provision within the general laws that
the legislature intended that it be used only in civil proceedings. 112
111.4 Application of the Rhode Island Statute
The provision for good faith decedent statements was first re-
ported in an estate dispute in 1929,113 where the Rhode Island
Supreme Court upheld the use of the exception when used to intro-
duce testimony of a decedent's statements to her son concerning
facts about a real estate conveyance. In 1933, the court stated in
dicta that "[tihis statute is identical with the Massachusetts stat-
ute - Mass. Gen. Laws, Chap. 233, § 65." 1 -4 In following the Mas-
sachusetts court's liberal interpretation of the provision, the court
emphasized that since the facts to which the witness was testifying
were within the personal knowledge of the decedent, and if living
the decedent could have testified to the same facts, the testimony
was admissible. 115 Similar patterns of interpretation of the rule
continued throughout the years between 1927 and 1987,116 after
which the Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted the current Rhode
Island Rules of Evidence. 117
The Rhode Island rules do not completely parallel the federal
rules. 118 Furthermore, by expanding the applicability of Rule
804(c), the advisory committee adopted a rule which Congress ex-
112. See Bradley v. Quinn, 164 A. 330 (R.I. 1933) (finding that the Rhode Island
statute regarding decedent's statements was identical with the Massachusetts
statute).
113. Paulson v. Paulson, 145 A. 312 (R.I. 1929).
114. Bradley, 164 A. at 332. Later cases continued the theme that the provi-
sion for decedent declarations was "to promote the ends of justice" presented in the
early Massachusetts cases. See Waldman v. Shipyard Marina, Inc., 230 A.2d 841,
843 (R.I. 1967) (stating that the statute was intended to be liberally interpreted by
the trial justice toward achieving the ends of justice). Massachusetts cases have
held that its statute for decedent statements was remedial, and entitled to liberal
construction. See, e.g., Hall v. Reinherz, 77 N.E. 880 (Mass. 1906); American Ry.
Express v. Rowe, 14 F.2d 269 (1st Cir. 1926).
115. Bradley, 164 A. at 332.
116. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 4.
117. Daniel J. Donovan, Highlights of the New R.I. Rules of Evidence, 1988 R.I.
Bar J. 19. The advisory committee which developed the Rhode Island Rules of
Evidence submitted its final draft to the Supreme Court in 1986. Id. The Supreme
Court adopted the rules unchanged in an order dated July 23, 1987, and the R.I.
General Assembly enacted coordinating legislation repealing several sections of
the General Laws, including § 9-19-11. Id.
118. Id.
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plicitly rejected. 119 In recommending continuation of section 9-19-
11 as Rule 804(c), the advisory committee noted the following:
Section (c) incorporates R.I.G.L. § 9-19-11. It is similar
to an exception proposed by the Federal Advisory Committee
and the Supreme Court as FRE 804(b)(2), but deleted by
Congress.
R.I.G.L. § 9-19-11, adopted in 1927, was based on an
identical Massachusetts statute, M.G.L.A. ch. 233, § 65.
Under the Rhode Island statute and under the rule, declara-
tions by deceased persons which could have been testified to
had the declarant remained alive are admissible if the court
finds that the declaration was made in good faith, prior to
commencement of the action, and upon the personal knowl-
edge of the declarant. If one of these elements is missing, the
statement will be excluded. However, no special formula for
satisfying the foundational requirements exists, even in the
jury cases. Further, the court may find that the foundational
requirements are satisfied based on reasonable inferences,
and formal findings are not required.
Unlike the exception for dying declarations contained in
Rule 804(b)(2), this exception applies in all criminal and civil
cases, and is not limited to the cause or circumstances of the
declarant's impending death.
Application of this exception to criminal cases goes be-
yond the scope of the Massachusetts statute from which this
rule derives, but there appears no persuasive reason to limit
the exception to civil cases. Constitutional considerations
concerning the admission of statements under this section
against an accused are subject to the same analysis as state-
ments admitted under the exceptions for dying declarations,
former testimony, etc. Analysis of the constitutionality of ad-
mitting such statements must be made on a case by case
basis. 120
Despite the advisory committee's broadening of its application, in
practice 804(c) remained steadfastly in the civil realm 121 until
1990, when it was first used in a prosecution to introduce hearsay
evidence in State v. Burke.' 22 The committee, however, chose not
119. R.I. R. Evid. 804(c) advisory committee's note, reprinted in Green, supra
note 103, at 804-13.
120. Id. (citations ommitted).
121. See cases cited supra note 4.
122. 574 A.2d 1217 (R.I. 1990).
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to amend the rule's language to make the applicability of the rule
in a criminal case explicit, leaving it for the courts to work out.
Manifesting their willingness to broaden the rule's application, the
committee wrote that "there appears no persuasive reason to limit
the exception to civil cases."123
111.5 Conclusion
While Rhode Island Rule 804(c) is bereft of the debate and ad-
justment which led to the workable, present-day Massachusetts
rule, the Massachusetts rule has benefited from years of legislative
and judicial correction. Congress, concerned with the scope of the
federal rules, abandoned the exception for statements of recent
perception, a provision which was similar to Rule 804(c). Rule
804(c) has not been the focus of any attention with the exception of
the advisory committee's review which led to the 1987 rules of evi-
dence. This is particularly true regarding its application in a crim-
inal setting, which was an issue of first impression for the Rhode
Island Supreme Court in 1990, when it decided State v. Burke.124
The long precedential history of the rule in practice, the reluctance
of Congress to enact a bill containing the exception for statements
of recent perception, the restriction to civil cases of the Massachu-
setts rule on which the Rhode Island rule is founded, and the long
history of debate leading to the present day absence of any similar
rule on a large scale across the country leads to the conclusion that
this rule does not belong in the criminal courtroom.
IV. APPLICATION OF RuLE 804(c) IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
As Rule 804(c)'s origin and legal history demonstrate its un-
suitability for application in criminal cases, practical application of
the rule further underscores the need for its reevaluation. State v.
Burke1-25 and State v. Scholl126 illustrate the potential problems
associated with applying this rule in a criminal prosecution. Parts
IV.1 and IV.2 summarize the facts of Burke and Scholl, followed by
an evaluation in Section V of the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
treatment and interpretation of Rule 804(c) in the two cases.
123. R.I. R. Evid. 804(c) advisory committee's note, reprinted in Green, supra
note 103, at 804-13.
124. 574 A.2d 1217.
125. Id.
126. State v. Scholl, 661 A.2d 55 (R.I. 1995).
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Since the promulgation of the exception for declarations of de-
cedent made in good faith, Burke and Scholl are the only two re-
ported cases in which it has been applied in criminal cases. In both
instances, hearsay statements were found admissible at trial
under Rules 804(c), defendants were convicted and convictions
were affirmed on appeal. The Burke court opened the door for use
of the exception in criminal cases when it found it need not "strug-
gle with the language of ... Rule 804(c) in an effort to discern the
legislative intent behind its enactment.... The Advisory Commit-
tee's notes clearly articulate the intended reach of the excep-
tion. . 12 The court adopted the advisory committee's
interpretation that "the statute was intended to apply to criminal
proceedings, provided, of course, that constitutional safeguards are
met."12
8
IV.1 State v. Burke
In State v. Burke, two co-defendants were convicted in a jury
trial of conspiracy to rob and two counts of robbery, and in addi-
tion, individually, one defendant was convicted of one count of as-
sault and battery on a person over 60 years of age, and the other of
attempted robbery.1 29 During the course of this robbery of a small
variety store, witnesses testified that the co-defendants beat the
store owner, Lucien Laurence, with a baseball bat.130 Laurence
was taken to the hospital for treatment, and checked himself out
that same evening.13 ' After he checked out of the hospital, Lau-
rence spoke to his daughter, Gloria Flaherty, about the robbery. 132
He died two months after the incident of natural causes, at age 71,
and his daughter testified as to his statements made that night
under Rule 804(c). 133
127. Burke, 574 A.2d at 1221-22.
128. Id. at 1222. These constitutional safeguards relate to the discussion in
Part II regarding the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965).
129. 574 A.2d at 1219.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1220.
132. Id. at 1220. Flaherty testified to her father's statements about the amount
of money which was taken in the robbery. Id. at 1220-21. The victim's statements
were not made in anticipation of impending death, and therefore were not eligible
for admission under the dying declarations exception. Id. at 1223.
133. Id. at 1220.
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At trial, defense counsel objected to Flaherty's testimony, ar-
guing that Rule 804(c) did not operate to render such hearsay
statements admissible in criminal proceedings. 134 After a voir dire
hearing, the trial justice found the hearsay admissible under Rule
804(c). 135
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld its admis-
sibility. 136 The portion of the opinion addressing Rule 804(c) first
rejected the argument that the language of the rule on its face
demonstrates that it was intended for use only in civil actions.137
The court relied solely on the advisory committee's notes 138 regard-
ing the intended reach of the exception, and concluded that "the
statute was intended to apply to criminal proceedings." 139 The
court recognized the importance of the defendant's constitutional
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, but added that this
right was tempered by notions of practicality and judicial econ-
omy.' 40 The hearsay exceptions, the court continued, permitted
the factfinder access to a "great deal of testimony" that it might
otherwise never see or hear because of the Confrontation Clause
restrictions.' 4 ' The court cited the general test for the admissibil-
ity of hearsay evidence under Ohio v. Roberts, with approval 142
and evaluated Flaherty's statements using that approach.
134. Id. at 1221. Defendants relied upon two theories to support the assertion
that Rule 804(c) did not render this testimony admissible in a criminal proceeding.
Id. First, that the language of the rule on its face demonstrates that it was in-
tended to apply only to civil actions. Id. Second, that the applicability of Rule
804(c) in a criminal case infringed upon the defendant's constitutional right to con-
frontation. Id.
135. Id. at 1221, n.1.
136. Id. at 1223.
137. Id. at 1221-22. The opinion noted that the rule's language is identical to
that first enacted in Massachusetts in 1898. Id. See supra part III.1. It then re-
jected the premise that the rule was not intended for use in criminal cases as in
Massachusetts. Id. at 1221-22 (discussing Commonwealth v. Gallo, 175 N.E. 718,
725 (1931)). In Gallo, the supreme judicial court concluded that based upon the
language of the original statute, the word "[a]ction, although a word of broad im-
port, can hardly be interpreted in this connection as intended to include prosecu-
tions for crime." Id.
138. Burke, 574 A.2d at 1222. See supra part III.4 for a review of the advisory
committee's notes.
139. Burke, 574 A.2d at 1222.
140. Id.
141. Id. (citing Fed. R. Evid. 803, 804; R.I. R. Evid. 803, 804).
142. Id. See supra part II for a discussion of this two-pronged approach.
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The court stated that the unavailability of the witness in this
case was undisputed, since the declarant victim had died prior to
trial.143 Second, the court noted that 804(c) was not a firmly rooted
exception, and therefore the court stated that it "must determine
whether these controversial declarations bear any 'indicia of relia-
bility' as required by Roberts."1 44 In finding that the requisite indi-
cia of reliability existed to "pass constitutional muster," the court
relied on the trial justice's findings regarding the requirements of
804(c).1 45 The opinion noted that the trial justice "specifically
found" that the good faith requirement was satisfied because the
statement involved:
[T]he words of an individual who purportedly had just been
robbed and beaten with a baseball bat; an individual who was
taken to the hospital and returned and is speaking to a blood
relative, his daughter; and he's saying to his daughter pre-
cisely what she says she is going to testify to. 1
46
Adopting the trial court's position, the supreme court stated,
"these findings also amply fulfill the indicia-of-reliability [sic] re-
quirement set forth in Roberts."147 The court went on to review the
trial justice's comments on the timing of the statement: "lIt has to
do with something that occurred and was stated prior to the com-
mencement of this action. This statement was made even before
the defendants were arrested. It is made on the premises shortly
after this robbery occurred."1 48 The robbery occurred between
10:30 and 10:45 p.m., and the police investigation commenced at
10:50 p.m., at which time Laurence was taken to the hospital by a
rescue unit for treatment of his injuries. 149 In a slightly different
read from the trial court, the supreme court found that Laurence's
143. Burke, 574 A.2d at 1222, n.4.
144. Id. at 1222. Where the exception is not firmly rooted, the evidence consid-
ered under the exception must be excluded, unless there is a showing of particular-
ized guarantees of trustworthiness. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
145. Burke, 574 A.2d at 1223.
146. Id. at 1223 (quoting State v. Burke, No. 89-55 (1988)).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1223. It was unclear from the supreme court opinion exactly when
the defendants were arrested. However, the fact summary presented by the
Supreme Court seems to indicate the discussion between Laurence and his daugh-
ter actually occurred after he checked himself out of the hospital. Id. at 1220.
149. Id.
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statements were made after he was discharged from the hospital
and once the investigation had begun. 150
The supreme court agreed with the trial court's finding that
the statements made "by an individual who purportedly had just
been robbed" satisfied the rule's requirement of personal knowl-
edge. 151 Thus the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
required under the Roberts test were held to be satisfied by the
fulfillment of Rule 804(c)'s four elements. 52 Five years later, a
similar result was obtained upon application of the rule in State v.
Scholl.153
IV.2 State v. Scholl
Clive Browne, a 73 year-old, wheelchair-bound resident of a
public apartment for the elderly, was attacked and robbed on
March 12, 1991, in an elevator in that building.'54 Browne did not
report the incident that night, and it went unreported until the
following day, when his home health care provider arrived.155 Res-
cue technicians transported Browne to the hospital.156 The rescue
technicians testified that Browne's blood pressure was nearly non-
existent and that he was in extreme pain.'5 7 One rescue techni-
cian also testified that Browne told him he had been attacked the
night before, and failed to report it because he had not wanted to
bother anyone.' 58 A security guard at Parenti Villa testified that
she had seen Tyrone Scholl in the building the night Browne was
attacked, and had watched him sign the register. 159 She also
noted that when she left her post to make rounds, visitors could
move into and out of the building at will, and in fact, that there
was a lot of traffic in the building at that time of night.160
150. Id. at 1220. Laurence spoke with his daughter after he left the hospital on
the evening of the robbery. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. State v. Scholl, 661 A.2d 55 (R.I. 1995).





159. Id. at 58. Detectives later confirmed that Scholl signed the log. Id. at 57.
160. Brief for Appellant at 11, State v. Scholl, 661 A.2d 55 (1995).
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Shortly after Browne was brought to Roger Williams Hospital,
a detective of the Providence Police Department spoke with him.161
The detective testified that Browne described the attack, saying
that he had been riding the elevator when another man got on. 162
When the elevator doors closed, the man proceeded to punch
Browne in the stomach several times, and took twelve dollars from
him.163 Browne then described the assailant to the detective, stat-
ing that he was a white male, five feet eight inches tall or taller,
having a husky build and reddish-blond hair, and not cleanly
shaven. 164
After this meeting, the detective and two other officers
checked the sign-in log at Parenti Villa, and recognized two names,
Luigi Ricci and the defendant's. 6 5 From past experience with the
defendant, they knew he fit the description given by Browne.' 66 A
second detective then returned to the station and assembled two
photo arrays, one with pictures of Ricci and five others, and one
with the defendant and five others. 16 7 The detective later met with
Browne in his hospital room.168 The detective testified that he
showed each picture in the photo packs separately. 16 9 Browne did
not identify anyone from the first set of photos, which contained
Ricci's photo. 170 When Browne saw defendant's photo, the detec-
tive testified that he "reached up and grabbed the photo, said 'Yes,
yes, that's the face, those are the eyes.'"171 The detective then
asked Browne "is this the man that assaulted you?" 172 Browne an-
swered, "I want to say yes. The hair is different so I can't swear to
161. Scholl, 661 A.2d at 57.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. In a photo taken for police purposes two months prior to this incident,
notations on the photo indicated that Scholl was 5'11" tall and 150 pounds. Brief
for Appellant at 9, n.5, State v. Scholl, 661 A.2d 55 (R.I. 1995). In addition, Scholl
had received severe head injuries when he was beaten with a tire-iron a couple of
years before this incident. Thereafter, and at the time of this incident, he walked
unsteadily and relied on a cane to maintain his balance. Id. at 12, n.8.
165. Scholl, 661 A.2d at 57. Defendant conceded that he was present at
Parenti Villa March 12, 1991 between 7:00 and 7:10 p.m. Id. at 58.
166. Id. at 57.
167. Id. at 57-8.




172. Brief for Appellant at 9, State v. Scholl, 661 A.2d 55 (R.I. 1995).
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it."173 Browne then told the detective "he would be able to make a
positive identification if he saw a more recent photograph or the
actual person."' 74 The detective returned the following day with a
more recent photo of Scholl, however, he was not permitted to see
Browne.' 75 Browne underwent surgery the day after the attack,
and never regained consciousness. 176 He never made a positive
identification of Scholl.
At Scholl's trial the photo identification made by Browne to
the detective was admitted under Rule 804(b)(2), the dying decla-
rations exception, and Rule 804(c). 177 With regard to the admissi-
bility of this testimony under 804(c), the trial court said:
We had a statute, a Dying Declaration statute, that has been
repealed by the adoption of the rule. And under that whole
statute, that was always considered to apply only to civil
cases. That's why it said prior to the cause of action some-
thing arising. Massachusetts has a very similar statute, and
Massachusetts has construed that to mean civil
proceedings. 178
The trial justice denied the defendant's motion to suppress the tes-
timony, 79 reasoning that since the Rhode Island Supreme Court
in Burke decided that the exception possessed the requisite degree
of reliability and trustworthiness, it lent credibility to Browne's
out-of-court identification statements. s18o Scholl was subsequently
found guilty of felony murder and the underlying robbery.' 8 1 In
affirming the application of Rule 804(c) to criminal cases, the
173. Scholl, 661 A.2d at 58.
174. Id.
175. Id. He was not allowed to see Browne, presumably due to the victim's
deteriorating physical condition.
176. Id. The state also offered testimony of the chief medical examiner for
Rhode Island, who had performed the autopsy on the victim Browne. Id. He testi-
fied that Browne's injuries were consistent with having recently been struck in the
abdomen, and that those blows would have been enough to cause the injuries. Id.
177. Id. The portion of the opinion addressing the dying declarations exception
is excluded from this analysis. The court found that the victim's statements to
rescue personnel, plus the surrounding circumstances, permitted an inference that
the victim was aware of his impending death. Id. at 60.
178. Transcript of Trial at 119, State v. Scholl, No. 93-200 (1992).
179. Id. at 139.
180. Id. at 124.
181. Scholl, 661 A.2d at 57. Following the verdict, the defendant lost his mo-
tion to dismiss the underlying robbery conviction, and was sentenced to a
mandatory life imprisonment. No separate sentence was imposed for the robbery.
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Rhode Island Supreme Court18 2 found no abuse of discretion in ad-
mitting Browne's statements, and upheld the trial court's ruling
that the statements "possessed the 'particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness' necessary to satisfy constitutional
requirements."18 3
After finding that the declarant was unavailable, the court re-
viewed the circumstances surrounding the making of the state-
ment to establish the indicia of reliability necessary for
admissibility. 184 The court validated the trial justice's finding of
good faith in the decedent's statements, reasoning that good faith
was demonstrated by several surrounding circumstances, as well
as corroborating evidence.' 8 5 The court adopted the trial court's
findings on the timing and personal knowledge elements of the
rule without elaboration.'8 6
V. EVALUATION OF THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF RULE 804(c)
The Confrontation Clause affords a criminal defendant some,
albeit indefinite, protection against inaccurate, unreliable testi-
mony from unavailable witnesses. 87 Thus, where a necessity for
evidence exists due to witness unavailability, several hearsay ex-
ceptions may be employed from which reliability may be in-
ferred. 8 8 Out-of-court statements which satisfy these exceptions'
requirements rise to a level of trustworthiness such that the de-
182. Id. at 60 (citing Burke, 574 A.2d at 1222) The court noted that since it
found the statements were admissible under Rule 804(b)(2), the dying declarations
exception, that it would "only briefly address this issue [804(c)]. Id.
183. Id. at 61.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 61. This evidence included: Browne's giving the same description of
his assailant to two detectives; his statement that he would be able to identify the
attacker because he had seen him at Parenti Villa before; that he grabbed the
photo and said that it was the face and eyes of the attacker; and that he was reluc-
tant to "swear" that the defendant was his attacker because the hair in the photo
was different from what he remembered. The court did not consider that the iden-
tification was not confirmed by a second review of a more current photo of the
defendant, nor that the victim specifically asked to see the photos again because he
was unsure of his identification. Id. at 58, 61.
186. "In addition, as required by Rule 804(c), Browne's statements were made
before the commencement of the action and based upon his personal knowledge."
Id. at 61.
187. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
188. See, e.g., id. at 66 (indicating that certain hearsay exceptions, including
former testimony and dying declarations, rest on such solid foundations that testi-
mony admitted within their bounds meets constitutional muster without more).
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fendant's confrontation rights are adequately addressed.'8 9
Where, however, out-of-court statements are introduced under an
exception which does not lend such inherent trustworthiness, fur-
ther inquiry into the credibility of the declarant and the circum-
stances surrounding the making of the statement is demanded. 190
Since Rule 804(c) is not considered an exception which lends
inherent trustworthiness to a hearsay statement,' 91 the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court has used the four elements of the rule to es-
tablish the requisite indicia of reliability.192 First, only statements
made by deceased declarants may be introduced. Once that
threshold is met, then reliability is established by finding that the
decedent made a statement in good faith, based on his personal
knowledge and before the action is commenced. If the court finds
the statement was reliable, it will be admitted. 193
In Burke and Scholl the Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that since the decedent's statements met the rule's requirements,
they possessed the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
189. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
190. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990).
191. See Burke, 574 A.2d at 1223.
192. See id. at 1222-23 (citing with approval the advisory committee's note stat-
ing that the "Constitutional considerations concerning the admission of statements
under this section against an accused are subject to the same analysis as state-
ments admitted under [the other Rule 804 exceptions]"). See also Scholl, 661 A.2d
at 61.
193. The Rhode Island advisory committee on the rules of evidence stated that
if any of the four elements of 804(c) are missing, a declaration will not be admissi-
ble. R.I. R. Evid. 804(c), reprinted in Green, supra note 103, at 804-14. Previously,
in interpreting the precursor to 804(c), the Rhode Island Supreme Court found
that:
a trial justice need not observe ritualistic procedures in determining com-
pliance with § 9-19-11. If it can be reasonably inferred from the circum-
stances surrounding the making of the statement by the deceased
declarant that the statement was based on personal knowledge and was
made in good faith prior to the institution of the action at hand, the trial
justice may rely [on] such inferences and may, on that basis, admit such
evidence without expressly finding compliance with each specific provi-
sion of the statute.
Morinville v. Old Colony Coop. Newport Nat'l Bank, 522 A.2d 1218, 1220 (1987)
(quoting Desmarais v. Taft-Pierce Mfg. Co., 252 A.2d 445, 449 (1969)). If this holds
true for criminal cases, a trial justice is not required to make formal findings on
whether the rule's criteria have been satisfied, even though the criteria are the
basis for the guarantees of trustworthiness necessary to meet constitutional
requirements.
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necessary to satisfy constitutional requirements. 194 However, the
opinions differ as to the meaning behind Rule 804(c)'s elements,
leading to irreconcilable differences in application and interpreta-
tion. Sections V.1 through V.3, which follow, present an analysis
of Rule 804(c)'s elements and their application in Burke and Scholl,
demonstrating that the rule as written does not ensure that state-
ments admitted under it are constitutionally reliable.
V.1 Unavailability
Unavailability is the threshold requirement for consideration
of an out-of-court statement under Rule 804.195 While Rule 804(c)
is listed separately from the standard 804(b) exceptions for un-
available witnesses, 196 it incorporates the unavailability require-
ment by permitting only consideration of statements made by
decedents. While the unavailability of the declarant has proven to
be a concern in recent United States Supreme Court decisions, 197
here it is not, by virtue of death being the most unavailable one can
be.
The unavailability requirement in Rule 804(c) creates a neces-
sity to procure the deceased declarant's statements through hear-
194. State v. Scholl, 661 A.2d 55, 61 (R.I. 1995). See State v. Burke, 574 A.2d
1217, 1222-23 (R.I. 1990).
195. R.I. R. Evid. 804(a). Unavailability includes the declarant's death, physi-
cal or mental illness, exemption by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege,
refusal to testify despite an order of the court, lack of memory on the subject mat-
ter, or ffight from the court's jurisdiction. R.I. R. Evid. 804(a)(1)-(5).
196. The trial court in Scholl described it as "this thing sticking out in the end"
[of the Rule 804 provisions]. Transcript of Trial at 120, State v. Scholl, No. 93-200
(1992). The question arises as to the reason that Rule 804(c) was not included in
the list of Rule 804 exceptions, to which any form of "unavailability" applies.
Under 804(c), only death of the declarant satisfies the unavailability requirement.
It would not be possible to consider a statement made by a declarant who was
unavailable by reason of physical or mental illness. The exclusion of the other
modes of unavailability points toward the particular importance of the declarant's
death to the operation of this exception. This is likely a result of the original use of
the provision to combat then existing dead man's statutes. 81 Am. Jur. 2d Wit-
nesses § 551 (1992). Where a survivor's testimony would be freely admissible, thus
countering the original dead man's statutes, so too should the deceased's
statements.
197. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); White v. Illinois 502 U.S.
346, 352-358 (1992) (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not require that,
before a trial court admits testimony under the spontaneous declaration and medi-
cal examination exceptions to the hearsay rule, either the prosecution must pro-
duce the declarant at trial or the trial court must find that the declarant is
unavailable).
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say testimony. In a broader sense, however, Rule 804(c)'s
requirement that unavailability is only established by the declar-
ant's death, evidences its character as a guarantor of the declar-
ant's trustworthiness. 198 All other Rule 804 exceptions only
consider the reliability of an out-of-court statement when the de-
clarant cannot be procured due to various reasons, for example,
flight from the jurisdiction or mental incapacitation. 199 On the
other hand, Rule 804(c) only can be employed where the declarant
is dead. The reason for this seems to be derived from the historical
use of the rule primarily in testamentary situations.200 This rea-
soning, however, seems to have been discarded, and as now inter-
preted in criminal prosecutions, the declarant's death reinforces
the reliability of his statements. 20 1 Otherwise, unavailability
under Rule 804(c) would be equivalent to unavailability in Rule
804(b), the standard unavailable witness hearsay exceptions.
V.2 Indicia of Reliability
The touchstone for unavailable witness hearsay statements is
that they must be reliable.20 2 The United States Supreme Court
has held that reliability may be inferred without more where evi-
dence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.20 3 An excep-
tion is firmly rooted where it is grounded in "longstanding judicial
and legislative experience in assessing its trustworthiness."20 4
198. The question arises as to the reason that Rule 804(c) was not included in
the list of Rule 804 exceptions, to which any form of "unavailability" applies.
Under 804(c), only death of the declarant satisfies the unavailability requirement.
It would not be possible to consider a statement made by a declarant who was
unavailable by reason of physical or mental illness. The exclusion of the other
modes of unavailability points toward the particular importance of the declarant's
death to the operation of this exception. This is likely a result of the original use of
the provision to combat then existing dead man's statutes. 81 Am. Jur. 2d Wit-
nesses, § 557 (1992). Where a survivor's testimony would be freely admissible,
thus countering the original dead man's statutes, so too should the deceased's
statements.
199. R.I. R. Evid. 804(a)(1)-(5).
200. See cases cited supra note 4.
201. This interpretation is similar to that for dying declarations, where the cir-
cumstances surrounding the declarant's death lend reliability to his statements.
Under that exception, however, only statements which relate to the cause or cir-
cumstances of the declarant's death can be introduced. See supra note 2.
202. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66.
203. Id. at 66.
204. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990). If qualifying as a firmly
rooted exception is a question of longevity, Rule 804(c) may qualify since it has
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Where an exception is not firmly rooted in jurisprudence, other
guarantees of trustworthiness must be evaluated. 20 5 For example,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court has found that Rule 804(c), de-
spite its vintage, is not a firmly rooted exception. 20 6 Consequently,
the court has looked to the elements of Rule 804(c) to provide the
necessary constitutional guarantees of trustworthiness.
Even though Rule 804(c) is not firmly rooted, it threatens to
swallow the longstanding, firmly rooted hearsay exception of dying
declarations. 207 Nearly any statement admitted under the dying
declarations exception can also be admitted under Rule 804(c), as
long as the declarant dies before trial.208 Rule 804(c), however, is
bereft of the psychological underpinnings and other traits that
lend dying declarations their reliability.20 9 The dying declaration
exception is based on the theory that the powerful psychological
forces which a person experiences in the moments before death
compel him to speak truthfully.210 These psychological aspects
guard against sincerity problems with statements admitted under
the exception. 2 11 Because their use is restricted in terms of timing
and content, dying declarations are also "unlikely to be affected by
problems in memory, although psychological stress and physical
been part of Rhode Island law since 1927. However, it was exclusively a creature
of the civil courts for 68 of those years. Alternatively, if "firm roots" is a question of
the volume of jurisdictions utilizing the exception, Rule 804(c) fails the test since
Rhode Island is the only state to employ this exception in a criminal setting. Even
those states which employ the rule for statements of recent perception are limited,
and of those states, only Wisconsin and New Mexico permit its use in criminal
proceedings.
205. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
206. See State v. Burke, 574 A.2d 1217, 1223 (R.I. 1990); State v. Scholl, 661
A.2d 55, 61 (R.I. 1995).
207. Brief for Appellant at 24, State v. Scholl, 661 A.2d 55 (R.I. 1995).
208. Rule 804(c) requires that statements have been made by a deceased de-
clarant, while dying declarations require that the declarant have made statements
in anticipation of impending death, and the declarant need not be deceased. R.I. R.
Evid. 804(b)(2). Dying declarations must involve the cause or circumstances of
what the declarant believed to be his impending death. Id. So long as a dying
declaration is made in good faith, prior to the commencement of an action and in
the declarant's personal knowledge, it can also be admitted under Rule 804(c). R.I.
R. Evid. 804(c).
209. See Wigmore, supra note 19, § 1438.
210. Glen Weissenberger, Federal Rule of Evidence 804: Admissible Hearsay
from an Unavailable Declarant, 55 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1079, 1107 (1987).
211. Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 30, § 8.61, at 1376 (noting that the "dy-
ing statement presupposes spontaneity on the part of the declarant, but the fact
that a statement is solicited should not foreclose use" of the exception).
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pain may cause flaws in perception and narration."212 All of these
attributes go toward establishing the reliability of an out-of-court
statement under the dying declarations exception, even though it
is not considered one of the most reliable exceptions. 213 Similar
traits are not present in Rule 804(c), although the Rhode Island
Supreme Court has interpreted the rule's elements as conferring
reliability on decedent's statements, similar to their interpretation
of dying declarations. 21 4
The standard for admitting statements falling outside a firmly
rooted hearsay exception such as dying declarations is a strict
one.2 15 With respect to the requirements of Rule 804(c), the Rhode
Island Supreme Court has relied on the trial justice's findings to
identify particularized guarantees of trustworthiness surrounding
statements admitted under the rule.2 16 The elements which must
be satisfied for the trial court to find such trustworthiness include
whether a decedent's statements were made in good faith, prior to
the commencement of the action and upon the decedent's personal
knowledge. 217
V.2.a Good Faith
The good faith218 element of Rule 804(c) is intended to show
that the deceased declarant was sincere when he made his out-of-
212. Weissenberger, supra note 210, at 1107. "Indeed, in many instances the
declarant is either suffering from an appreciable amount of pain or anxiety which
may itself cloud his perception and ability to communicate, or his perception and
consciousness have been dulled by pain-depressant drugs." Id. at 1106 (quoting
Charles W. Quick, Some Reflections on Dying Declarations, 6 How. L.J. 109, 112
(1960)).
213. H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7089.
214. See State v. Burke, 574 A.2d 1217, 1223 (R.I. 1990); State v. Scholl, 661
A.2d 55, 61 (R.I. 1995).
215. State v. Kiewert, 605 A.2d 1031, 1043 (N.H. 1992) (finding that state-
ments which fall outside a firmly rooted exception will be admitted only where
circumstances establish that "the statement offered is free enough from the risk of
inaccuracy and untrustworthiness, so that the test of cross-examination would be a
work of supererogation.") (quoting Wigmore, supra note 19, § 1420 at 251).
216. 574 A.2d at 1223.
217. See Burke, 574 A.2d at 1223; Scholl, 661 A.2d at 61.
218. Good faith is generally defined as "an honest belief, the absence of malice
and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage.. .. "
Black's Law Dictionary, 693 (6th. ed. 1990) (quoting Doyle v. Gordon, 158 N.Y.S.2d
248, 259, 260 (1954)).
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court statement. 219 A declarant's sincerity is an important consid-
eration in deciding whether to admit a particular hearsay state-
ment. But the fact that a person said something sincerely does not
also mean that the statement was reliable. The United States
Supreme Court, moreover, has declined to accept corroboration of
an out-of-court statement with evidence other than the circum-
stances surrounding the making of the statement.220 These cir-
cumstances alone must lend reliability and trustworthiness to the
declarant's statement, acting as a constitutional safeguard of the
defendant's confrontation rights.
In the sixty-plus years that the hearsay provision for dece-
dent's good faith statements was in use in civil proceedings, Rhode
Island courts have inferred good faith from many and varied situa-
tions.221 While the Burke and Scholl courts varied in their defini-
tion of "good faith," both courts considered the circumstances
surrounding the making of the statement to be significant.222
While this is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's
approach to unavailable witness hearsay,223 the circumstances
which are reviewable under Rule 804(c) do not always point to reli-
ability, and may, in fact, detract from it. In Burke, the court pre-
sumed good faith in the victim's statements because the declarant
had made the statement to his daughter shortly after being robbed
and beaten, but "prior to the commencement" of the "action."224
The trial court, quoted with approval by the supreme court, gave
219. See Scholl, 661 A.2d at 61 (finding deceased's identification of assailant
was in good faith because he was reluctant to 'swear" that his identification was
correct); Burke, 574 A.2d at 1223 (finding decedent's statements were in good faith
because he was speaking to a blood relative, not to police); Hamrick v. Yellow Cab
Co., 304 A.2d 666, 670 (R.I. 1975) (holding deceased cab driver's statements were
not in good faith because they were made to a police officer at the police station
during an investigation); Segee v. Cowan, 20 A.2d 220, 273 (R.I. 1941) (implying
decedent's statement to daughter was made in good faith).
220. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990) (refusing to consider cor-
roborating evidence for a statement introduced under a hearsay exception).
221. See, e.g., Hamrick, 304 A.2d at 670 (excluding statements on lack of good
faith where decedent made statements to police while in fear of prosecution);
Desmarais v. Taft-Pierce Mfg. Co., 252 A.2d 445, 449 (R.I. 1969) (presuming evi-
dence of good faith in statements made by a decedent to his son while he was in the
hospital for treatment from injuries received in an automobile accident which was
the subject of the case).
222. See Burke, 574 A.2d at 1223; Scholl, 661 A.2d at 61.
223. See Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
224. Burke, 574 A.2d at 1223.
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special emphasis to the fact that the statement was made to a
"blood relative," not to a police officer. 225 Throughout the line of
civil cases preceding Burke, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has
consistently found that statements made to family members met
the good faith test.22 6 In terms of the timing of the statement, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court in Burke adopted the trial court's
view that since the decedent's statement was made shortly after
the robbery, but before the defendants were arrested, it was made
in good faith.227 The implication is that the victim had nothing to
gain from statements made regarding the robbery, since they were
made prior to the arrest of particular suspects.
The Burke trial court also inferred the victim's good faith by
alluding to his poor physical and emotional condition at the time
he made the statements.228 This analysis is similar to that which
is required for a statement made under the dying declarations ex-
ception, where psychological forces compel the declarant to speak
truthfully. While this may point toward the declarant's sincerity,
it does not address the problem of possible misperception due to his
highly stressed state. 229 The declarant, through his physical pain
and in his highly emotional state, may not perceive ongoing events
accurately. The circumstances in Burke which the court found con-
ferred good faith on the declarant's statements could just as easily
provide legitimate inferences that the declarant's physical state
225. Id.
226. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has often noted that statements made
by one family member to another bear the mark of good faith, without more. See,
e.g., Desmarais, 252 A.2d at 449 (finding statements of father to son made in good
faith); Segee v. Cowan, 20 A.2d 270, 273 (R.I. 1941) (admitting statements made
in good faith from father to daughter on how an accident occurred); Bradley v.
Quinn, 164 A.2d 330, 332 (R.I. 1933) (admitting statements by decedent husband
to wife). Compare Hamrick, 304 A.2d at 667 (excluding statements made by de-
clarant to police during investigation of accident because not in good faith).
227. Burke, 574 A.2d at 1223.
228. Id. The court adopted the trial court's view, finding that since the state-
ments were those of a man who had just been beaten and robbed, the circum-
stances "amply" fulfilled the good faith requirement, but did not provide reasons
for its acquiescence.
229. A standard objective of cross examination of a hearsay witness is to test
the out-of-court declarant's perception of the events/subject matter to which he is
testifying. See Lilly, supra note 10. See, e.g., Kopinos v. Sommer's Transfer Co.,
170 A. 490, 491 (R.I. 1934) (admitting statements of victim under declaration of
decedent made in good faith exception after receipt of evidence as to victim's
mental condition at the time the statements were made to establish his perception
of the accident).
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would not allow him to perceive the events in question accurately.
If the element of good faith is to be a reliable indicator that the out-
of-court statements are trustworthy, the interpretation must be
sufficiently precise to exclude equally plausible interpretations.
While the Scholl court also found the declarant's statements to
have been made in good faith, its approach in reaching that conclu-
sion was different than that used in Burke. Citing as determina-
tive the facts that the victim's statements were made to a police
detective from the victim's hospital bed, at the instigation of a
detective, and during the course of the investigation, the court con-
cluded the statements were made in good faith.230 Unlike Burke,
the Scholl court did not address the declarant's physical and emo-
tional state either at the time he made his statements or at the
time of the incident. 231 In addition, the Scholl victim's uncertainty
in identifying his assailant was also characterized by the court as
evidence of his good faith.232 Moreover, in Scholl, the court consid-
ered the existence of corroborating evidence, other than the cir-
cumstances surrounding the making of the statement, as
supporting the finding of good faith. 23 3 The United States
Supreme Court has refused to consider corroboration of unavaila-
ble witness testimony with circumstances other than those sur-
rounding the making of the statement.234 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court, however, did not address the high court's reserva-
tions regarding corroboration in either Burke or Scholl. Finally,
even if the surrounding circumstances and the corroborating evi-
dence go toward proving the victim's good faith, they are not con-
clusive as to the reliability of the statements. 235
The Scholl court inferred good faith from the victim's state-
ments because he had made them to police from his hospital
230. State v. Scholl, 661 A.2d 55, 61 (R.I. 1995).
231. See id.
232. Id.
233. Id. The corroborating and circumstantial evidence was that the decedent
had given the same description of his assailant to two detectives, had said he could
identify the assailant because he had seen him in the building before, and made a
identification, albeit not definite, of the assailant from a photo array.
234. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819 (1990).
235. The United States Supreme Court's two pronged analysis to determine
whether hearsay statements of unavailable witnesses are sufficiently trustworthy
requires a determination that such statements carry adequate indicia of reliabil-
ity. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
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bed.2 36 Other jurisdictions have held that a victim's identification
statement was not made in good faith where it was made to a po-
lice officer who had gone to the victim's hospital room for the pur-
pose of obtaining identification of the assailant.237 Courts in these
jurisdictions reasoned that since the identification was made "at
the instigation of the officer, it was inadmissible.238 Spontaneity is
one factor which the United States Supreme Court has examined
when ruling on whether a declarant was likely to be truthful. 239
The Burke court also implied that a statement made to an investi-
gating officer is less indicative of a statement made in good faith
than that made to a family member. 240 Whether made to a family
member or to a police officer, the good faith requirement adds little
to the search for reliability in the decedent's statements that is suf-
ficient to overcome the lack of confrontation.
In contrast to Burke, the Scholl court gave no consideration to
the declarant's physical or emotional condition at the time of the
declarant's statements.241 In Scholl, however, even though the de-
clarant was an elderly man, hospitalized with severe internal inju-
ries who died some days after making his statements to detectives,
the court declined to consider his deteriorating health or emotional
state. 242 Absent this consideration, the court was unable to ad-
dress the corresponding issues of the declarant's memory or per-
ception, which may have lent doubt to the accuracy of his
statements.
The Scholl court also found good faith in the victim's uncer-
tainty regarding the identification of his assailant and in his reluc-
tance to "swear" that the defendant was his attacker.243 Again,
though this may point to the good faith of the declarant, it seri-
236. See 661 A.2d at 61.
237. See, e.g., State v. Barela, 643 P.2d 287 (N.M. 1982) (statements of recent
perception); State v. Kiewert, 605 A.2d 1031 (N.H. 1992) (hearsay exception for
statement against penal interest).
238. Id. New Mexico employs the exception for statements of recent perception
in criminal proceedings. This was the exception on which the prosecution relied in
Barela, in a situation similar to State v. Scholl. See supra part 111.2.
239. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 821-22 (1990).
240. Burke, 574 A.2d at 1223 (stating "In the Court's judgment that's a state-
ment made in good faith. It's not made to a police officer. It is made to a family
member . ").
241. Scholl, 661 A.2d at 61.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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ously undermines the accuracy and reliability of the declaration.
Analogously, under the firmly rooted exception for dying declara-
tions, an identification is inadmissible "if it constitutes mere opin-
ion or conclusion of the declarant, or is too vague or uncertain. A
declaration will be inadmissible if it merely expresses a belief as to
the identity of the assailant, rather than a positive statement of
identification."244 Despite the inherent trustworthiness of a state-
ment admitted under the dying declarations exception, if such a
statement merely expresses a belief as to the identification of the
assailant, rather than a positive statement of identification, it will
be inadmissible. 245 So too, should an equivocal identification made
under the far less reliable Rule 804(c) be excluded.
In addition to their analysis of the factual circumstances, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court in Scholl reviewed several pieces of
corroborating evidence toward its finding of good faith in the vic-
tim's statements. 246 Under the United States Supreme Court's
analysis in Idaho v. Wright,247 evidence coming in under a hearsay
exception must be intrinsically trustworthy, not acquiring its
trustworthiness "by reference to other evidence at trial."248 For ex-
ample, the Scholl court found it indicative of the declarant's good
faith that he said he could identify Scholl as his attacker since he
had seen him in the building before. 249 The fact that the victim
had seen his assailant in the building before does not relate to the
circumstances surrounding his statement of identification. Cor-
roborating the victim's identification of Scholl with this evidence
does not comport with the United States Supreme Court's ap-
proach in Idaho v. Wright,250 in that it did not render this declar-
244. 2 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 314 at 351-52 (14th
ed. 1986). See also State v. Pailin, 576 A.2d 1384 (R.I. 1990) (holding that a declar-
ant's expression of an opinion or a conclusion is not admissible in evidence as a
dying declaration).
245. Id.
246. See Scholl, 661 A.2d at 61.
247. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
248. State v. Kiewert, 605 A.2d 1031, 1043 (N.H. 1992) (quoting Wright, 497
U.S. at 822). It is questionable whether the Wright Court's analysis will endure,
since two of the five justices in the majority have since retired. Edward J. Im-
winkelreid, The Constitutionalization of Hearsay: The Extent to Which the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments Permit or Require the Liberalization of the Hearsay Rules,
76 Minn. L. Rev. 521, 528 (1992).
249. 661 A.2d at 61.
250. 497 U.S. 805 (refusing to consider medical evidence of sexual abuse as cor-
roborating the reliability of the child's identification of her abuser).
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ant's identification of the assailant "particularly worthy of belief"
under the circumstances. 251 The court's analysis is at odds with
the standards set forth in Idaho v. Wright and hence violates the
Confrontation Clause.
Therefore, while a statement which is made by a decedent in
good faith is helpful in overcoming the inherent hearsay danger of
insincerity, it does not address the equally critical concerns of am-
biguity, perception or memory. In fact, the very circumstances
which may lead to an inference of good faith are the same circum-
stances which point to the possible unreliability of the statements.
If Rule 804(c) is to provide a reliable basis on which to admit state-
ments against defendants without benefit of confrontation, the
timing and personal knowledge elements must overcome the weak-
nesses presented in the good faith element.
V.2.b Prior to Commencement of the Action?
The timing language of Rule 804(c), "prior to commencement
of the action," seems to imply usage in a civil setting. Lack of a
clear definition for this language as applied in a criminal setting
has led the courts to formulate their own varying interpreta-
tions.252 The inconsistencies which have developed as a result of
the court's uncertainty regarding this language illustrate the neg-
ligible importance of this element of Rule 804(c) in establishing an
out-of-court statement's reliability.
251. Wright, 497 U.S. at 819. If the Rhode Island court's analysis of the good
faith of the victim's statements in Scholl were to stand up under the Idaho v.
Wright analysis, it would be limited to reviewing factors which relate to whether
the hearsay statements made by the declarant was reliable. Id. at 821. Factors
include the declarant's adequate chance to observe, spontaneity of speaking, likeli-
hood of sufficient recollection, and absence of motive to falsify. Id. In Scholl, for
example, it is not known whether the victim was wearing his eyeglasses at the
time of the assault nor at the time he reviewed the photo arrays and identified the
defendant. Brief for Appellant at 36, State v. Scholl, 661 A.2d 55 (R.I. 1995). The
identification was made at the instigation of a detective who had a specific suspect
in mind, and therefore cannot be considered spontaneous. Scholl, 661 A.2d at 58-
59. With testimony that the victim "had his wits about him only 'at times,'" it is
unclear whether he was able to accurately perceive and recall what happened at
the time of the assault. Brief for Appellant at 36, State v. Scholl, 661 A.2d 55 (R.I.
1995).
252. See Scholl, 661 A.2d at 61 (suggesting that the action was commenced the
day after the start of the investigation, but after police had a specific suspect);
Burke, 574 A.2d at 1223 (inferring that commencement of the action was at some
point "shortly after" the initiation of the investigation but prior to identification of
a specific suspect).
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The common definition of the term "commencement of the ac-
tion" in the Rhode Island legal system is, in part, as follows:
A civil action is commenced (1) by filing a complaint with the
court together with payment of the entry fee prescribed by
law, or (2) by depositing the complaint with said fee in the
mail addressed to an officer for service, or (3) by delivery of a
summons and complaint to an officer for service .... 253
It is unclear in Rhode Island whether the term "commencement of
the action" is applicable to criminal prosecutions, and if it is, how it
is to be applied. 254 At least prior to the adoption of 1987 Rules of
Evidence the term "commencement of the action" was construed
only in the context of civil actions. The term does not appear in the
Rhode Island Rules of Criminal Procedure, leading to the conclu-
sion that it is considered a civil term of art in this jurisdiction.
There are several points in a criminal prosecution at which the
action could be considered to have "commenced," for example, upon
arrest, upon initiation of a formal investigation of the incident or of
a specific suspect, upon indictment, or others. Since there is no
benchmark for this moment, it is difficult for courts to define
whether statements made by decedents under Rule 804(c) are ac-
tually made prior to commencement of the action.255 Burke shed
little light on this elusive concept. In Burke, the court reviewed
the trial justice's summary of the timing of the statement, which
was as follows: "it has to do with something that occurred and was
stated prior to the commencement of this action. This statement
was made even before the defendants were arrested. It is made on
the premises shortly after this robbery occurred."256 The dece-
253. Superior Ct. R. Civ. Proc. 3. Note that the rules of criminal procedure in
Rhode Island do not refer to "commencement" of an."action," as is typical in civil
proceedings, but rather use the criminal law terminology of "complaint" which sets
forth the offense charged. Sup. Ct. R. Crim. Pro. 3. Historically, the term "com-
mencement of the action" belonged in the civil realm. See, e.g., State v. Barela, 643
P.2d 287, 289 (N.M. 1982) (finding that where an identification of defendant was
made at the instigation of police during their investigation of an aggravated bat-
tery it was not prior to commencement of the action); Commonwealth v. Gallo, 175
N.E. 718, 725 (Mass. 1931) (stating that although "action" is a word of broad im-
port, it cannot be interpreted as intended to include prosecutions for crime).
254. See Brief for Appellant at 30, n.13, State v. Scholl, 661 A.2d 55 (R.I. 1995).
255. In jurisdictions using statements of recent perception exception in crimi-
nal cases, courts have refused to admit statements made by an unavailable declar-
ant which were "in response to the instigation of a person engaged in
investigating, litigating or settling a claim." Barela, 643 P.2d at 289.
256. Burke, 574 A.2d at 1223.
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dent's statements in Burke were made after the investigation had
begun but prior to the arrest of the defendants. 257 This would sug-
gest that arrest, rather than initiation of an investigation of a spe-
cific perpetrator, is equivalent to "commencing the action" in a
criminal proceeding. However, in Scholl, the decedent's state-
ments were made the day after the investigation had begun, and
after police had a definite suspect.258 This is even further into the
criminal process, albeit still prior to arrest, than in Burke, yet was
considered to be prior to "commencement of the action".
In comparison, the rule for statements of recent perception, re-
jected by the federal system but employed in Wisconsin and New
Mexico criminal courts,259 was specific in defining the timing issue
as "not in contemplation of pending or anticipated litigation in
which he [declarant] was interested ... "260 and further, that the
statement could not be "in response to the instigation of a person
engaged in investigating... a claim ... "261 At a minimum, Rule
804(c) should be similarly amended to clearly define what consti-
tutes the commencement of the action in a criminal context. Then
such amendment would lend additional trustworthiness by lessen-
ing the possibility that a statement elicited by police for investiga-
tion purposes can be admitted under this exception, without at
least first meeting the requirements of another hearsay exception
such as former testimony and dying declarations.
In conclusion, as Rule 804(c) currently exists, this requirement
is too vague to add to the reliability of an unavailable witness's
statements in the absence of confrontation. It is difficult to find a
particularized guarantee of trustworthiness in a statement sup-
posedly made "prior to commencement of the action," when this el-
ement is not clearly defined, or even inapplicable, in a criminal
setting. Amending the rule to clarify the timing requirement, or
requiring equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness, 262 would substantially increase the court's ability to assess
257. Id. at 1220.
258. State v. Scholl, 661 A.2d 55, 58 (R.I. 1995).
259. See supra note 100.
260. Rule 804. Hearsay Exceptions: Declarant Unavailable, 56 F.R.D. 183, 321
(1973).
261. Id.
262. A statement having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness has other indicia of reliability equal to those provided under one of the stan-
dard unavailable witness hearsay exceptions. R.I. R. Evid. 804(b)(5).
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the admissibility of an out-of-court statement in a criminal prose-
cution under Rule 804(c).
V.2.c Decedent's Personal Knowledge
Rule 804(c) requires the declarant's statement to have been
made from personal knowledge of the statement's subject mat-
ter. 26 3 For a declarant to have personal knowledge he must speak
from his own sensory perception. 264 The personal knowledge of an
unavailable declarant may be easily established. However, it is
more difficult to determine the quality of his knowledge, the very
aspect of this Rule 804(c) element which is directly related to the
reliability of his statements. 265
The Burke court answered the personal knowledge question by
finding that the statements were made "by an individual who pur-
portedly had just been robbed."266 Since the statements were
based on the victim's account of the robbery from his sensory per-
ception, it was within his personal knowledge. However, the court
did not address the circumstances under which this personal
knowledge had been gained so as to shed light on the quality of the
declarant's perception of the events. 267 While the court was will-
ing to infer that the emotional state of the declarant after the inci-
dent lent good faith to his statements, they declined to consider
whether his emotional or physical condition may have adversely
impacted his perception of the events. 268
Similarly, in Scholl, the court found the declarant had per-
sonal knowledge of the assault, but failed to address the quality of
that knowledge. In Scholl, the elderly, wheelchair-bound victim
was punched in the abdomen and robbed while riding in an eleva-
tor in his building.269 The trial justice rightly found that he had
personal knowledge because he "had the opportunity to view his
263. R.I. R. Evid. 804(c).
264. Booth v. State, 508 A.2d 976, 981 (Md. 1986).
265. Id.
266. State v. Burke, 574 A.2d 1217, 1223 (R.I. 1990).
267. The victim had been beaten with a baseball bat, and later hospitalized for
his injuries. See id. His statements were made the night of the beating, after he
had checked himself out of the hospital. Id. at 1220.
268. See id.
269. State v. Scholl, 661 A.2d 55, 57 (R.I. 1995).
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attacker."270 However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court refrained
from any review of the trial justice's findings as to the nature or
quality of the declarant's perception during the assault.271 Again,
analogous to Burke, the facts which established the personal
knowledge element of Rule 804(c) are the same facts which go to-
ward the possible unreliability of the witness's perception and
statements.
Without a complete understanding of the quality of perception,
the sole fact that a declarant had personal knowledge contributes
little to the reliability inquiry in Confrontation Clause analysis.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court in both Burke and Scholl was
quick to agree with the trial courts' findings that the declarants
had personal knowledge, but declined to review the character of
the knowledge as it related to the reliability of the declarants'
statements. Thus, although a declarant's positive, personal knowl-
edge may satisfy the rule, such knowledge cannot overcome a
statement's lack of reliability, even where accompanied by the de-
clarant's good faith.
V.3 Conclusion
In summary, Rule 804(c) fails to provide a criminal defendant
with adequate constitutional safeguards against unreliable testi-
mony. First, while the rule's unavailability requirement creates
the necessity to produce the deceased declarant's statements,
under Rule 804(c), unavailability is only satisfied by the declar-
ant's death. This is indicative of the unavailability element's char-
acter as a guarantor of the declarant's trustworthiness. 272
270. Transcript of Trial at 138, State v. Scholl, No. 93-200 (1992). In addition,
there was a substantial variance between the declarant's description of Scholl and
his actual appearance at the time of the incident. The victim's description was of a
"white male, five feet eight inches tall or taller, having a husky build and reddish-
blond hair, and not cleanly shaven." Scholl, 661 A.2d at 57. Notes on a Providence
Police Department photograph taken two months before the incident, described
Scholl as "5'11" tall and 150 pounds." See Brief for Appellant at 9 n.5, State v.
Scholl, 661 A.2d 55 (R.I. 1995).
271. At trial, witnesses testified that the victim regularly wore glasses, Tran-
script of Trial at 173, 200, State v. Scholl, No. 93-200, but no witnesses could tes-
tify as to whether the victim was wearing his glasses on the night of the assault.
Witnesses also testified that the victim had his wits about him only "at times." Id.
at 194.
272. The question arises as to the reason that Rule 804(c) was not included in
the list of Rule 804 exceptions, to which any form of "unavailability" applies.
Under 804(c), only death of the declarant satisfies the unavailability requirement.
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Unavailability in the other Rule 804 exceptions can be satisfied in
a variety of ways such as flight from the jurisdiction or mental in-
capacitation. 273 If the declarant's death was not considered as ad-
ding to the reliability inquiry, unavailability under Rule 804(c)
would be equivalent to the situations considered in the standard
unavailable witness hearsay exceptions.
Second, while the good faith element of Rule 804(c) provides a
method to determine whether a declarant is sincere, it neither as-
sists in determining whether the declarant's statement is reliable,
nor does it address the equally critical concerns of ambiguity, per-
ception or memory. Circumstances which point to an inference of
good faith are often identical to those which indicate the possible
unreliability of the statements. Declarant statements may be com-
pletely sincere, but completely unreliable, particularly where a po-
lice identification procedure is involved. Third, Rule 804(c)'s
timing element, which requires that a statement be made prior to
commencement of the action, is too vague a term on which to base
a determination of reliability. It also does not provide protection
from a witness's faulty memory, since a decedent's statement may
have been made several years in advance of a legal proceeding.27 4
Fourth, without consideration of the quality of the declarant's per-
ception, the personal knowledge element of Rule 804(c) provides
only a minimal contribution to the reliability inquiry. The rule as
a whole does not provide equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness
to the traditional hearsay exceptions, and fails to provide adequate
indicia of reliability. The Rhode Island courts' use of Rule 804(c) to
decide the admissibility of an out-of-court statement in a criminal
courtroom thus depletes a defendant's constitutional rights under
the Confrontation Clause.
The Rhode Island experience with Rule 804(c) in criminal
prosecutions has been limited, but revealing. If faced with this is-
It would not be possible to consider a statement made by a declarant who was
unavailable by reason of physical or mental illness. The exclusion of the other
modes of unavailability points toward the particular importance of the declarant's
death to the operation of this exception. This is likely a result of the original use of
the provision to combat then existing dead man's statutes. 81 Am. Jur. 2d Wit-
nesses § 551 (1992). Where a survivor's testimony would be freely admissible, thus
countering the original dead man's statutes, so too should the deceased's
statements.
273. R.I. R. Evid. 804(a)(1)-(5).
274. See, e.g., McLain v. Tripp, 53 A.2d 919 (R.I. 1947) (statements introduced
at trial were made in 1927, and the action commenced in 1944).
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sue again, the Rhode Island Supreme Court should request clarifi-
cation and amendment of the rule's language. The court should
limit the rule's applicability to civil actions. If the court declines to
limit the rule's scope, it should require that any testimony admit-
ted under this rule in a criminal setting must also meet the re-
quirements of one of the other hearsay exceptions under Rule 804.
Alternatively, the court should require equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness similar to those required under the
residual hearsay exception. 275
The language of the rule should be clarified to more clearly
define the meaning of "commencement of the action" for use in a
criminal setting. For example, adding language limiting the state-
ment to one which was "not in response to the instigation of a per-
son engaged in investigating, litigating, or settling a claim, which
narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition recently per-
ceived by the declarant... not in contemplation of pending or an-
ticipated litigation in which he was interested.... - 276 In addition,
to improve the probability that statements admitted under the rule
were made with personal knowledge of an appropriate quality, lan-
guage such as "while his recollection was clear"2 7 7 should be ad-
ded. Such changes would be positive steps toward shoring up the
ebbing protection extended to defendants under the Confrontation
Clause in Rhode Island.
Deborah M. Kupa
275. R.I. R. Evid. 804(b)(5).
276. See N.M. R. Evid. 804(b)(2) (statements of recent perception).
277. Id.
